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I NTRODUCT I ON
Un ti l th e establishment o f the Fi sher y Conser v ation
and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA)1 fi sh outside the United
State' s twel ve-mil e f i sher y z o n e were~ according to
int e rnational l aw, common property and bel ong ed t o the
nation or indi vidual that caught t hem. Th is c o mmo n
p rop erty l aw was b a sed on the c o n c e p t that f ish resour ces
large that no amount of fishing would inter f e re
with the right o f others t o catch fi s h . Mod e rn
t e c h n o l o g y , however, has created equipment that enabled"
f or e i g n and dome stic fi sh~rmen to o ver-fish th e resou rce.
Reejuc ed domestic catch finally lead coastal f i s her me n t o
s u p p o r t a b i l l that unil a terall y e xtended the United
Stat e s f i s h e r i e s juri sd iction to 200 miles.
Before the FCMA~ the di s tant water f l e et s of t h e
Un ited States and foreign nati ons t o ok a dvan t a ge of the
com mon p r oper ty s tat us o f f i s h a n d o per at e d o f f the c o a sts
o f other n a ti ons . For example, the United S t a tes t u n a
f leet fol l o ws t u n a into wa t ers a d j ac en t t o man y n a ti on s .
The U.S. tuna f i s herm e n were f earf u l l of a U.S. u n i l a t e r a l
extens ion t o a 200 {ni le f i shing z o n e t r i g g e r i n g
1Th e
is known
FC MA, a n d
Fi sh e r y Con servation a n d Management Act of 1976
as th e 2 0 0 Mi l e Blil. the 2 00 Mi le L i mi t, the
Publi c Law 9 4 -265 (h e ar af ter c i ted as the F CM Al.
e xten si on s e li mi nat i n g t he i r t r a d i t i o nal fis h i n g
I n order to red u c e t he o bj e c t i o n s o f t h e tuna
Congr e s s d ecid ed
migratory speci e s , s.u c: h 1!·Jit h t h i·::. o n e
pol i t i c ,::"1 1
q€·?t c o n g ress to pass a hil l that gi ves priorit y fi s hi n g
r i g h ts t o the U.S. fis he rmen o n th e basl s o f n at ionality.
s u p p o r t e d this b il l b ec ause
t hE' ,/ l:) E? l :i. (;:! \J f.:~ cj th,:"lt. f ishi ng would b e s t op p~j and
t hat fl ":? E?t . could t t-', E?n catch fi s h without
i n t erf er e nce o r reg ula t i o n . Congr ess had dif fer ent ideas.
It th at --a renewable resource providing
:i 1"1 C o en {,::~ t; h ('? (?'c on omv ~ food f ew
sport sm en-- ha v e bee n threatened through
LI.n C Dr-; t; ro ' C) 1 :I. (-?o cl f i ~:; h i n c..1• I t f (: !!1 t. that catches s hou ld be
to promote the r ec ove r y o f t he stoc ks and f u ll
u t. i. Li z i,;\ t . i or: elf
t h a t; for eign and domest i c fish i ng
t h (O! p ro' ob 1 ('2iTl ~, fi s h e ries sho u ld be regulat e d on a
as we l l as in t e rna tional l e ve13 .
s up p o sed to disc r im inat e a mo n g
f isher men , there cl e arl y i s t h e p oss i bil i t y of
2FCMA Sec .2 ~ i n di n gs , p urposes an d p ol ic y.
3FCMA Sec.2 Fin di n g s , purposes a nd poli c y .
Commi tt e e on Co mmerce, A Legis l at ive Hist o r y
F isher y a n d Man agement Ac t o f 19 7 6,
p . 3 70. ( h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as Le g i sl ati v e History).
U. 3. ,
CJ+ t h~...:~
p . ::;(~ :=; •
d i. ,::; c 1"- :i. in :i. n at :i. 0 n a llocati on CJ{=
e x am p le , t he mo nth s of p e a k h ar v e st fo r cod
a r e d i f f er en t f or e ach state in New En gl and, s o a c o d
c losure has a greater e c o n o mi c i mpact o n th e s t ate
whos e p e ak f i s h i ng coinci des wi th the c losu re .
I n t h e FCMA t here are S e ven
. ] j .i n c . u c 11""·,g prohib i ts d i sc rimin ation
tIl E
p ot ,,::.,n t i. a], iTia n a q(;::.- rOE?n t t ech n i ques c a u s e ec o n o mi c damage to
o r·j E? 1;.11·-· C) U P elf n ot c,\n o t.h (·?r • T IT l S E!conom i c
d :i.· f +I:;:'I'- i~ n t i al i mp a ct; ma y b e d iscr iminator y and prohi bi t ed
b y E;t.dncl a ~-cl Four or t he regi o na l cou ncils s houl d a t le a st
t r ea t ing al l r esi den t s t h e
Alt h ough Stan dard Four i s le~ all y n o mor e i .mp o rtant
th an t he o the r s, it is the topic of th i s thesi s.
j= O Ll ,- " or t he e con o mic c o n seq u e n c e s o f fi sher ies m~nagement
sti:\tf?S it
u nd e r-s t i:.'I n d
:; t o c:k s; o f
p o int·:.~~ ( 1) wh ich i n s titut i on s ma n ag e t h e
o bjectives cou l d b e reach ed
( 3 ) th e o p t i mu m y i e l d f r om a f i s h e r y ,
( ·::1· ) t hF-'? st.-.Del:: "'\S'=:·E~s;~=;rn(·2 n t:. i n ~? ·l: h Del s; ~
tec hniques avai lab l e ~
DC: c:ut'"" "
an d how d i s c r imi n at ion cou l d
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CH APTER I. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter deals with the local~ state~ and federal
fisheries managers, and their activ ities in the f i s h e r i e s
zone s e t u p by the FCMA. The three nati onal d ep artment s
t h a t have a role in managing the f i s h are the De p a rt men t
of Commerce~ the Department of T r an sp or t a t i o n ~ and the
Department o f State. The reg ional c ouncils~ set up b y the
FCMA~ function as an intermediate level bet ween the
f ederal and state governments. The regional c o u n c i l s were
set up b y the FCMA b ecause the pr oblems of
manag ement s h o u l d be managed at a l oedl l e v el bu t n o o n e
s t a t e
f ish.
l S large enough to encQumpas the entire s toc k o f
JURISDICTION
The j u r i s d ic t i o n a l breakdown~ fo r f ish e r ies purposes,
o f the wat e rs adjac ent t o th e United States coast consists
of two ban ds of oc e an whi ch a r e contr olled by ei th er the
r espective state governments or
The F isher y Co nse rva ti o n
the federal g ove r n me n t.
i s me a sur ed 1 9 7 nautical
miles seaward fr om the t erritorial Th is band is
s u p erv ised , in an ex e c ut ive se n se ~ by t h e De p ar tmen t of
Th e territorial sea 1 S mea sured t h r e e nauti cal
miles f rom t h e l o w wat er mar k , o r the c l o si n g l in es which
s eparate t h e intern al wa t e rs f rom t he t erri to r ia l 522, and
stat e governm0nts.
t.1·l c:i\t c o n t r a d ic tor y and
r eg u l ati o n s cou ld .:'-idoptecj I:::, \/ t .I·1 E? s t; "itt I;?~:.
;.- ~,~s P (~! c: t i './ f2 th ree-mile z on e s, i t. ma d e p rovi s i o n s f o r
federal preemption of s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n s4 .
REGIONAL COUNCI LS
Til e n::MA s e ts up eight reg ion a l management councils
function as an i ntermediate l e vel of government. The
i' ·('=! c;.l i oriaI c oun c i 1 '5 in clude th e Mid-Atlantic Co u n c i l , t h e
Ho u tll ·-(~t :l. an t ic: C:; ourl c i 1 ~I thE! (]ul + Council, t h e Caribbean
Co u n e: i 1. :' til l;? F'a c: i. fie Counc t t , the Nor t h F'.::l.cific Counc:i.l,
Pac i fi c Co u n ci l , and th e New England Council.
0+ the Ne w England Council wi l l s er ve a s
an e xample of t. h e c o mp os i t i o n of the cou n c i l s in general.
The New England Counc il has seventeen voting members:
the f i s h e r i es d ep a r t me nt hea d f r o m e ach o f thE~ f :i v (~
sta t(~S ~1 '·'1a r-j.n e
F i sheries S e rvi c e ( NMFS, a s u bs i d ia r y o f t h e De p artmen t of
C:c)rni"nerC E? ) , r ep r esent a ti ves a ppo inted
Secretary of Commerce f rom l i s t s of q u a li f i ed in di v i du a l s
4 Th r- (~e
O C C U I'· : ( 1 )
2 '.J n E:~ (Bust
must t:C:1.k f2
tl'-I E' ,::le t i o ri
sU.bst ·:.:\nt i a 1
c ondition s are necessar y b e for e pr eempti o n c an
a management plan f o r the fi s he r y c onser v a tion
lJF2 i n i,,~ f +F2c t , ( 2) t l" !(?' ma j ol·· it y o f tl-I ~? + i ':;hi n g
place i n the F i sher y Conser v ation Z on e ~ an d (3 )
or i n ac t i on of 2 s ta t e mus t ha v e h ad a
a n d ad verse e f fect on th e ma n agement plan .
':;ta.t ~? cJo\/el~ncjr-. Non-vot ing members
i n c l u de rep~esentati ves f rom the Coast Guar d , the State
DI::!p dl'- t !T!(,2n t; , the Fi s h a n d Wildl if e Serv ice~ and the Marine
Commi ~5s<i o ri .. c ou r.c i 1 ,,:; hi:\ \ /(::!!
di fferent non-vot i n g members specif ied.
Th e FCMA r equir e s that the Secretar y o f Commerce
least one of the eleven members at l a r g e from
(,2 c\c h in In the New England Council,
appointment s includ ed four representati ves from
i'la ss2\c:huset. t; s:., th~ee from Rhode Island, twa fr om Maine,
f r o m Connecticut
INDUSTRY REPRESENTATION
(J f i nd i. v i dual s"
originally appointed to the New England Coun c i l, ten we r e
:i ndustl~Y an d one was a u n i v e r s i ty
It :;UI~p r: is i nq
i n clust. rv '·-i:?l at. ecl, bE:Ci:lU!3 t? "thE~ tf?I" ril "qu;::\ li'i: i(::~d indi ./iclui::\l '
indi vidua l l;,j~'lO kn owledgabl e o r e xperienced
tAii til reg ard s to the managemen t, conservati o n, r e cr e ati ona l
c Ofnfn,,~r- c i oJ,1 t:he
By d e finiti on, th e member s
5 I t l:i. d .
c o u rrc i Lss ..
f i s h e r y mana g em ent
ii·.1i. 1 1 be people wh o have had ,:;:,nough
(0);'; p erI eric (2 thei~ occupations to be considered a
"qu,-:::ili··f=j.ed i nd i vLcf u a L, '
Indust~y ~epresentatives of the New England Council
include processors, deal el'-',;!, c ommel'- c i a J.
to conclude that all industry representati ves have the
interests and will vote as a block on all
Some of the original Council representati ves have
two or more constituent groups. For example, one member
vessels and processes fish and another is a
+1'-' om a co-operative belonging
The v o t i n g patterns will,
t o CDmml'?j'-C i al
in
group that has the greatist representation on the Council.
61bid. ~:; E?C . :::;:0 2 (b) (:L) ( C ) . ')oting (jH~,nbE!r·~5.
Th~? p I~ OC'::? '3~5 ad op t ed ·f OJ'- se 1 (~c t; :i n 9 <~ 00 q ua 1 i '(~ i. ,:;:,,j
I n d i vi. e!lXi"d" tel ,=; f~rve on thE! Cotrn ci I n·",dl,.lces the
possibility of a consumer r e p r e s e n t a t ive . A consumer
representati ve coule! oppose biological management
techniques that the commercial interests may champion
because the costs would be pa s sed on to the consumer. The
fisher y biologist or economist could then provide neutral
'::; C: i E~ I' -i t i ,r :i . c E! \i:i.cIE!nCE~ t.o j'--i,? !:;ol \il'? I::: I-I E! c onrLt ct, Da ta
supplied by an economist could help resol ve the conflict
between reducing costs for the consumer and keeping
fishermen e mp l o y e d . The elimination of a cost-cutting
technology always costs the con sumer more money , even
though it may help stabializ e t h e brood s t o c k of fish. A
legall y sanctioned regulator y body with onl y s e l e c ted
special interest groups represented h as the potential f or
E~C:: CWIDiTd. c i:3.buse of ·t1-le conS;UI1lel'-.
OnC€·3 the pos sib ilit y of
s p e c ia l int e~est p ~ essures e xis t .
COUNCIL RESPONS IBILITIES
Council s h a ve the task o f develop ing a
rn a n a.g e me nt plan few e .:3.ch ·:5pec:i.e o ·f i. n thei. ,.-
respeet i ve ~egions7.
to ma i n t a i n a close relation with those at the most local
in and aff ect e d b y fi s h e r i e s management.
Commel"·c:e is gi ven authorit y under the
IJ iII to ,::'Ic t ,:is the , e ;': E.~cut:i. \/ 12 . ' "13 When the ~ egional
Coun c i l s in
disag~eements about v·Jh~? th e l..··
a dv i s o ry bodies fo~ the Department o f Commerce o r separate
leg is l a tive bodies. The National Ma~ine F i sheri es Se~vice
( NI"'I F S ) i. n th~?
th at t h e Counci l s have the p r i ma~ y ~ole in d e v e l o p me n t o f
f i shel'· y plans anej t h at th8il~ ro l e e ;. :tt:~ncJs
a d \ /:i s o r '/ c o rnrnit t t:i::? 119 HC)\A/e \ l8r- ~ ~:; om (;?
Council s fe e l t h a t the Co unci ls
t reated l i k e ad vi s or y comm ittees.
is c au s ed b y the Coun ci l s f o rced r e liance o n NMF S data t o
7 I bi d .
8 Ib i. d .
,.-. ~.. -
·-:=J'::.'L"
~3(·::; c •
302 ( l:i)( l ). Functi on ·:5 ..
304. Action b y the Secret a r y.
9 LJ" S .
l "'I .:~n EtC;) e me n t
I\II'"IF~S ~I
CClu nc i l ,
Op e~ ation s Man ual ;
J u n e 11 ,1 9 7 6, pl-5
r-~i 'o:; h s l..·· i (as
e stabli sh t he Opt i mu m Yield COY) and b y t he legi s lated
pl ,3, n~, ,,
o 'f the Secretar y o f Co mme r c e to veto the Council
I:l y f el l 1 C)[A) :i, ri C]
SI::,q uE?nC (? of i n fell'" inEIt:l on q i:"l t h('? ~-:i. n q cin el
·for"i1ii:'~ti.on " Th e Counc ils must first determine the
o b j e c t ives t D be met b y the plan (explained l a t er ) and
ol:Jta:f. n t h e Maximum S ust ainable Yi e l d (MS Y )
scienti f ic inf ormat i eln ava i l a b l e l 0 .
The
c o l I \::::ct (~d t o (·?~:;t (::\bllSh th e MSY, s o t he New
Court c:i 1 U.SE?S thE? :i roo i nfonnati em. I f t.h i '~
in+01'" ma t i ort underestimating the st elck o f f i s h
or t h e MSY, it ma y result in ec:onomic descriminati on when
a s ma l ler catch i s di vided among c o mpe t. i n g users.
The MSY f o r a p articular species is modified into the
Opt i ilium Yi ",·1 d (O Y) c ounc il mee t i ngs a n d publi c
hearings by considering soc i al , economic , and ecological
Next, the Council must e s t i ma t e how mu ch o f t he
s p ec ies the domestic The amount o f f i s h
th dt c a n not catc h , n ot e xceed i n g t h e
Oy ~ iss t h l:!2 Tot a I (111 Dhlal:l 1 E-? Le VI:;?1 Fi sh i n q
( TiC:,LFF) 1.1. F :l n a l 1 Y" mu s t· a llDc a te t h e
amon g c:omp t:?t i I. C.J b :}'
10 FCMA S e c . 3 01.
f i s h e r i es c o n s e rva t ion a n d
C:d C2 ) . I\!a'ti on a l
m .:~n .:~q '? ITlellt "
--------------------- ------- - -
v.,li t h t h e _
national standards.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE RESPONS I BI LI TI ES
On t h e n ati on a I
(DOC) has the authori t y to approve t h e f i s h e r y management
ol e n s, ,
a n d determine t he a s s ess me n t
vi 01 .::\t OI'· ':;:I.:~ .. Bcause ,t h e f i s h e r i e s management plans must
bi-? pl-epa/l~ ed accDl"'d ing to n at icm a I ~:;t:and,?\I-':d'=-;~1 tl-l(-? DDe mu-=.:;t
review fisher ies management plans and v e t o them if the y do
not meet the follDwing national standards cont ained in th e
FCMA:
( EI) In (3 <-:~nf2r,:11 .. i(~n \/ fi :=;hi.:?r i E~ !5 m.=\na Cji?ment p lan
prepared, a n d any regUlation promulgated to
implement an y such plan , pur suant t o this title
shall be c ons istent with the following nat ional
s t a n d a r d s for fi sher i es conser v ation and
management~ ,
( 1) Conservation a n d ma n ag e ment me a sures s h al l
p revent o verfishing while a chiev ing , on a
continuing basis, t h e op timum y i eld f rom e ach
f i shl:?I~ Y.
( 2 ) Co nserva t i o n a nd man agement me~sures s h a ll
be based up on the b e s t sc i entifi c informat ion
,:\V el i Lab 1 E~ ..
(3) To the e xtent pract ic able, an i n d iv i d ua l
st o ck o f f ish s h a l l be ma naged a s a unit
throughout its ran ge, and interrelat ed stoc k s of
f ish s ha l l b e man a g ed as a un it or i n close
cO Cl r d i n a t i o n ..
11 IIJicl. S f:.':c . :2 0 1 (el) .. To t ed !-4 1:LD(,\l a b l f':l U :?'v'Ed
o f Foreign F ish i n g ..
12Ibid. S ec . 3 04. Act ion b y Secret ary .
(4) Con s ervation and management me asures s h al l
not discriminate b etween res idents of different
States. If it becomes necessar y to allocate or
a ssign fishing privileges among various United
States fishermen, such allocation shall be CAl
·f: 2 . i 1·- <=\n d (O'!q u i t al:J 1 (.? t D Elll ~:;uch f i s h er ifI(?r1 , ( J3 )
reasonably calculated to promote conservation ;
and ( C ) carried out in such manner that no
particular individual, corporation, or other
entity acquires an excessi ve share o f such
p r: i ve l E~qes.
(5) Conservation and man agement measures shall,
where practicable, promote efficienc y in the
uti lization of fisher y resources; e xcept t h a t no
such measure shall have e conomic allocation as
its sole purpose.
( 6) Conservation a n d management measures shall
take into account and allow f o r v a r i a t i o n s
among, and c o n t i n g e n c es in, fisheries, fisher y
resources, and catches.
(7) Con ser v ation and management measures shall,
wher~ practicable , minimize costs and avoid
unnecessary duplication13.
On thes e s e v e n national stan dar d s a n d
the d efinition of Optimum Yield , the Secretary q f Commerce
mu s t , public r.:\ 11 other bureacrat ic
either promulgate enabling regulations or send
thf-:? inEln,:i(j(?ment plan b ack to the Council for amendmen t s14.
]. .c. , Council doe s not act within a reasonable
t :i.iT1(-? :1 t hE! Sec re t a ry ma y pr epare his own
management plan15.
emerg ency i nvolv i n g
{-'il ~::· o " :i. ··F th i::? f.11=,cl~et ,3.r- y f :i.nd ·:;:; th c·~t. an
p rornu l 9 o.,t e (;2 mE?r·· ~~ ~? Il C Y I" ee] u 1 <., t i on a •.. IllS.
:l. :::::Ibicl. ~3ec. ::::: 0 1 " 1'~2·\tiCin al
conser vation and management .
Stand a r ds f o r f ish e r i e s
:l.4Ibid. Sec. 304. Act i on by S e c ret a ry.
amendment ap pro ved or prepared b y him, in accordance with
" " t I' -, t (' t I F-' r:11 " ') "1 '-, '1"'''1i.,'_" I:~·l'~ 1'''1' 1',' ',':."" t; ,':-\ t ; 1,',_'", ';..,,- :t h '2 PI~ i:) 'v'lSlClns; o 'f' ', Y l :: ; {--fC ' , ",-,E,! " ,_,'M , n .' , - - , ', '. •
t. h a t; " th E~ ini t iat e a n d maintai n a
c ornpr eh€~ns i v e P ,'-oql'-a rn of +i sh er" y I~ es,:?ar- c: h • •• II 1. 8.
Oc eanic and Atmosph er i c Admin istration,
a sect i o n o ·f the Department of Commerce, has a di vi s ion
ca l l e d the NMFS
supplies Co u n ci l
The NMFS makes f i sh s t o ck assessment ,
support personnel, and a s s ists t h e Co ast
Gu a r d i n e n f o r c i n g of t h f,~ I~~C I"I A . Th e NMFS has a v o t i n g
seat on the reg ional Counc il a n d can u s e its position to
a f f e c t poli cy decisions.
the stoc k a sse s s me n t st aff,
If the Council support staff ,
and the Council seat holder
f r o m NMFS wan ted to, th e y coul d mani p ul at e th e r esults o f
the s u rveys and champion a managemen t pl an th at wou l d
d iscriminat e in s u b t le wa ys between residents of di f fe rent
:~ t a t es .
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPOR TATION RESP ONSIB ILITIES
The Coe sst; a d i v ision r0",., the De p a r t me nt of
Transportat i on, i s t he primar y e n force ment di vi s ion o f t he
15 I b i d . Sec. 3 0 4 (c l. Preparation b y t h e Secre ta r y .
16Ib id. Sec . 3 0 5 (e l. Emer genc y Acti ons.
17 Ibi d.
:3t::.' C I~ (;? t c:\ t'- '~:/ •
~3e c: " Res pon s ibi l it y of
18Ibi d. Sec. 3 0 4 (el . Fi sheri e s resear ch .
F'a I~~ E? 1 :::
The e n f o r c e men t activities include surveill ance,
c i tc:d~ iona , and patrolling the zone
for the domest i c a s well a s fo reign fleet s. ThEi CD2iSt
Guard also h as non - voting representatives on the regional
Councils to ad vise on enforcemen t matters and keep up to
date on pending regulations.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE RESPONSIBILITIES
The :O'~par-tmE?nt 0-;= St<~:~F:! nE?goti. att~·=. 011 t h fOI'-€·? i qn
t.o
Fisheries Agreements These GIFA's include an
acknowledgment of the United States' right to manage the
inside the 200 mile fishing z o n e , the ri.ght of a
United States of ficial to i n sp e ct a f i shing vessel a t sea
and seize it for vi.olations, the right to reciprocal
·f i sh(?r- i ('~ ~5 and the obliqation to pay for
en forcement costs19.
The Department of State also must distribute the
Tota I Allowable Level of Foreign Fishing on a yearl y basis
t o th e for e ign nation s that have signed GI FA's. "The
total 1 e v€·? 1 of f oreign fish ing, if any, with
respect to an y fisher y s u b j ec t to the e xclusi ve fish ery
:·;:::() I b i d .
F=-j. <5 1"'1i Ill].
man c\q (~m(.::!!nt
F'E\qf? 1.4
authority of the United States, s h a l l b e that
pcwt i C;i1 of the optimum y i e l d o f such fi shery whi ch will
no t
it·,,:; <:\lJ.ocE~t icjn d ecisions the Department of state must
c o n s;u 1 t. the Departmen t o f Co mme rce a nd c o n s i d e r the
following items specified in the FCMA:
<1. ) Whether, and to what e xtent, the f i s h i n g
vessels o f s u c h nations have traditionall y
engaged in fishing s u c h fi shery;
( 2 ) Whether such nations ha ve cooperated with
thf? Uri i tf2d ~;t:.ates in, c:ind I1h':ide s ub s t ,::in t i 'oil
contributions to, fisher y research and the
identification of f i s h e ry resources;
(3) Whether such nations have cooperated in
enforcemen t and with respect to the conse r vation
and management of f i s h e r y resources; and
(4) Such other matters as the Secretary of
State, in cooperation with the Secretary <of
Commerce), deems appropriate21 .
1- _
1 1 .c.;\ ~ also been designated the
c o ord i n at. i ng the Depc:\J~tmei1ts of
TI·-anspc'l-tati on and Commerce concerning seizures of fo reign
nation' s v e s s e l s when they are found in violation of the
d iscussion of the roles played b y feder a l
Loc a l t.he i. r" o b I :i. (J at i. on·:; a ri d
indicates on e rea s o n f or p oor response
time in the management pr ocess . S o me t i mes a management
2 1 I b i d . Sec 201 ( e) . Alloc ation of Allowable Leve l .
d E?\lE?lop by d efault~ b e c a u s e the pr ocesses
b .......
- i
s o muc h t i me that other manag eme nt
optiDn s c a n n ot ad op t ,:::~ cl in a meaningf ul t i me- frame .
~3 t Of"lf:?V-J i:d 1 i n q i n C- Y I I f1 c i t ,'I' ,-" = t; -,' ,'- --I --,~ _ •... h ;.. ~ ... . f~::. =:> has been resp on si b le fo r
closures on cod fishing resulting in di f ferential economic
e-f f (?c t: ~:; (-;?\/ E':11 thDU(;jh t h e Co u n c i l s op p osed c l osu res as a
mallagem(~nt t: E?c l-i n i qcJ e .
CHAPTER II : FISHERIES MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES
in vol ves balancing the f u ll
ut, i 1 i z a ton 0+ f i s h with conser vation in order to ensure a
stc:lC k and e qui t abl e a l l o c a t i o n of t h e catch bet ween
In t'\ :i. 's IJ00 k The Manaql::lment o··f "'-lar-:i ne
Fi sh er- :ies , J ohn A Gulland s t a t e s :
.,.If f ish r-esources we r e u~ d er single
ownersh ip, management would ra ise f ew major-
problems. There would b e some scienti fi c wor-k
i n a d v i s i n g o n t h e bes t management pol ic y , but
the great pr-obl em s of r-e ach:ing dec:ision s o n wh a t
l imi t s should be a chieved , wo u l d be dealt wi th
a s p ar-t o f t he c o mp l e te p r-o cedur e o f man aging
fi sh b us i n e s s , o f whic h t h e f i s h resources would
be a major c api tal a sset.22
Fisher y managers wh o advo cat ed nati ona l c o nt rol of the
r e s ource b efor e the F CMA b a sed their- argument s on their-
that n e t i on e l olt-JmrJesh i,P l eads to rational
th e FCMA c a me i nto f o r-c e , th e fi sh er y
managers continued to percei ve the government as the sale
nl,"'inE~r t.he + :i sh r-E:' SClUr- CI2 S a ri el ,,:id \/oc clt (:?d
strategies based on t h at f a lse assumpti on . 1~ 1 th o ugh tli '::;?
g o vern men t n o w control s t h e f is h e~ies management~
sto c k s ar e st I l l c o n s i d e r e d to be common p r op e rt y.
Common p r op er-t y r esou r-c es a re h el d i n trust b y our
(:.; " l3u 1 1 i:H'll:1 ~l Tti§ 1"1 i,,'1 n ':", g t~ 11'1 E'2.Qt:. q£
Un i v ersi t y o f Washing t on Press ,
F i 's h e r :i, i'=: ~:;; ~
p, ,''J..
governmen t
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for th e general public and are the property o f
t h e first person who reduces t h e m t o his possession.
Therefore, i Ii the traditional sense elf ownershi p, the
government d oes not own the fish in the sea. Management
can cmly h~ concerned with restricting the opportunities
of the public to reduce t h e f i s h to ownership, ( c a t c h
fish), without creating a pri vileged or restricted cl ass
o f indi viduals who alone are permitted t o f ish .
Therefore, the management of marine fisheries can not be
b ased on an y theor y th a t assu me s th at one individual , a
restricted class o f indi viduals, or one government owns
them. Who then are the individuals. that mak e up the
unrestric ted class of people that benefit from
conservation ? Thi s i s a p o l i t i ca l allocat ion process
decided during the Regional Council's meetings.
CONSERVATION OBJECTIVE
Fisher y con s er v ati on is the planned management of a
natural resource in order to preven t o ver-exploitation o r
destruction of f i s h e r y re s ources. In practice~
conser vation guards or ~5aves a species f r o m har-m o r
change . However , the reason for this protecti on i s s o the
s p e c ies can be used to e n h a n c e man's wel far e. Presumabl y,
this works b est on fish stoc ks that are not be ing
o ver-exploited to the point o f ex t i n c t i o n and whose
habitat is not significantly altered b y man 's act iv i t i e s .
This concept is c losest to the idea o f farm ing or
ranching the
,
s e a because it implies that it is wise to
l eave a t least one bull and c ow to p r o duc e a new h erd of'
cattle f o r the farmer's future use. Most fishermen do not
op o o sse concept of conservation but th l='I~I:0 ts
consider abl e disagr eement as to HOW MU CH con servation is
HOW the conser vation should be prac ticed.
The c o n tr o v e r s y can i l l ust r at e d with an ex c e r p t from
managE~ment objectives b y th e New England
Fisher y Managemen t Counc il:
Over th e plan period e xpec ted th e total
removals will be e stablished on a yearl y basis
c onsi stent wi th th e o verall ob ject ive as
constrained by an ac c ept able probabil ity of
a chieving the biological st ock condi ti on s b y t h e
end of the plan period, and a min imum s pawn in g
stock level for each species which ensures an
a cceptable probab ility o f continued
1·-'2C r- u it men t 2 :3.
propert y resource where i t i s to thei r short term b enefit
to t h ei r maximum indi vidual
abilit/; i. n s t a ric e , if a sport fisherman r e l eas e s a
:i n the hopes that it will g row, h e kn o ws t ha t
the c h a n c e of recapturing the fish himse lf is ver y small.
The sp o rt f i sherman a lso kn o ws th a t i f t ha t f i sh is c aught
agai.n th e next day, th e other f i s her ma n will pr obabl y n o t
:L t . Th(·? "1 o q :i c al" c o n c I u sd on i <::; to ('2 [1 j 0 '/ th(~
smc~ll f i s h now a n d forg et conser vation. I n some respect s ,
th e i n d i v i du aI to t h e ind ep endent
sovereign state that s eeks to ma ximi ze i ts power in the
T :.I b i d , p . i ..
t h r o u q f
F'~\qE 1. (':f
diplomac y o r war, e ven though the action
i s not. in t he long ter m best interest of e ither humanit y
FUTURE OP I TONS OBJECTIVE
T h e FCI'1A a t t e mp ts to a d d ress t he c o nf li c t between
har vesti ng more fish today and f a c i n g fewer options fo r
future h arvest s. A c o nse rvat ion ob j ec t ive' contained in
t~le ·f i '::;her y man agement maintains II _<:\
iTlU 1 t i p I i c it y el f opt i o ns a vailable with r e s p ec t t o future
U':3es of 1·-e~; CJLl i'-C(=·5. 11 24 Thi',; Clb ject i ve
CCJul {j in I~ ej eeti n q ~::;Ll<;J (,:;)f=~c3ti ori-s f Dr fi'5hery
management policies that c o u l d el imi na t e a s p ecies of
of i sh. For instance, at pr e sent neither the commerc ia l nor
t h e r ecreation a l
iTlClre t h a n a nuisanc e . Howe ver, a management pl an
th a t; the Se a Robin wo u l d preclude an a s y e t
un known future use fo r the Sea Rob in.
c:\SP f.:~ ct the "mul ti plicity' of o p t; i ems"
con s er vation o b j e c t ive i s the possibi lity o f preclud ing
fut ur e harvest s because a fish s pecies i s p r esen t ly i n
p "-'2ser va t i on .. i ntel:-estec:1
(2 nv i I~Clnm(·?rlt Ii,!o u l cl ,:\r-'C;ju e t .h at; fi s h sp e c ies wh o s e
ex istence has b een t hrouqh fishing o i l
p o ll u ti o n s hou l d b e pr eser ~ed f or it s o wn i n heren t v2 l ue
as a unique and irreplaceable creature.
is a more restrict i ve c oncep t
CCH1SE~I" '\ia t ion it means to keep or guard from harm,
i n j urv , but it e x cludes man s
does not maintain a
"mu lt.Lp Li c i Lv o·f opti ons" for future harvest as required
the F=-C 1'1 A b u t it ma y be the only wa y to manage some
The best examples of preservation a re on land,
where man has b een able to exert mo re con t r o l o ver animals
for a longer period of time than in the oceans.
the buffalo of the Mid-West was almost
until gave the herds a chance at
t h ouqh
h i. ~lhl!'Ji~ )is.
thei r h abitat i s largel y destroy ed
Some biologists would argue that
are in a situation similar to the buffalo and need
in to ~;ur-vi v\;:. One l ogical way to
df2t.enni nco? if a fish stock 1 5 to be conserved or preserved
is to address the question of habitat d~struction. r ..F the
habitat has been altered to a point that continued
survi val is doubtful~ then the fish need preser vation.
HABIT AT PROTECTION AND INHANCEMENT OBJECTIVE
Contrary to popular c: o n cc:> p t s , tile OCt:an is not a
homogeneous mass of There are subt.le di ffer ences
in the bottom mater ial, temperature, salinit y, a n d other
parameters that c r e a t e unique habitats for the
c r e a t u r e s in the s ea. Frequently a s p e c ies will
Inrt ab i t; un i. qu~? n i ch0?s i.n the sea as the members
in their life cycle. T C) d f?~:; t. ~- ov on E:~
as an estuary used b y' a species for the
juvenile nursery~ i 0:; equi vi 1 f2nt to genocide through the
elimination of children.
An one fHFt.110ci clf f i '5h
thl~OUI]"'l snhancsil10?nt would be
h,3t.cher i (·?5. E;(tl~f"~mE~ n a t ure l variation of year classes
coupl i;?d ~"i th untimely ,:;tock asssessmer,ts cr-eate
uncertainties concerning the appropriate management plans.
Some management uncertainty could be removed if hatcheries
CCH.tl cI insure a good harvest by supplementing the natural
If the biologists could learn to raise theI'-l:?pl'·oduct ion.
j uV7f2n i I (-=' ,f: ish t hroutjh the first stages, which have high
r·ates~l
speci'fic niche requirements are. Unfortunately, the life
cyc:IE~s o ·f most of the commercial and recreational species
completely understood, it i'5 clif-fic:Lllt to
effect on stock v~i th
Cl='.t a st r oph(~ ~ ~:; u c h as an oil blowout. Thl'?
information gained from research could be used to document
I~ (:22\sDn ~5 ·f Cl~-' protecting specl~lc habitats. (incl the 'suppl '/
of juvenile individuals would guarantee that the species
HCiuld not b eCCliTll~ e}~ tinct. The securit y from extinction
would permit more latitude ' in other management decisions .
CONSUMER OBJECTIVES
Besides the commercial and recrational fishermen, the
shoulcl be a benefactor of fisheries management.
1-I O\ ·t '_~. \-_·1 ','ll-I 't·.1'1(,c.~. I=r,_-,'I~f~ 'l-,.I-,=\t. fisheries IJrovide food forCiJngl'-'t?~:;s c '11 -
n 0:\t i on lJ U t; d i d not:
II 1- 1 ',-.."\ 1 t; 1"1 "_'"'1.1 go.1-1 l' i.'.. I' '.'..:;. c\ S t i:'tt E~d (J b J'e c:t; i V f.2
_. (J 1'- E) ~-:: 2\fH p i"~ , \
that fisheries should to assure a supply of
it stated that the quality should be high,
that PI~ i ces ~:;hOLll d be and that supplies should be
few people who advocate
fisheries management for the benefit of consumers and who
enough to attend Regional Council meetings
in to secure a reduction in fish prices or prevent
the Extinction of a species of fish.
lack c:on '=.;umer i nt i2res;t
iII ustTC\'I:ecl by the New England Fishery Management
Council's three page st,3.t'2ment on management objectives
I.,o.jlii cli includes onl y the following reference to consumers:
"In benefits to usel'·s ~'.(-? i nc l u d e incornes to har-vestel"s arrd
procEssors as well a~:; the va I UE~S t.o consumer~:;. "26 The
v'c'tl u.e:;:; to consumers are never defined and yet they are one
of the groundfish management plan's purported objectives.
In an situation there should be a
group to oppose the special interests of the commercial
25,John
1'-1 ";1.n aCJsmE?1'1 t
Conci'2ptui:\1
~::' 4 ..
E.. 1«;;)11 y, II Ttl e F:i,;;h BI'-'y Con S(:?I~ \/ i""t :i on
A~t of 1976- Organizational Structure
F: t-' d mi:21,'j(J to, k~, " 1'10.-'1 r ' :i Ii (.? F'o l i c:'y' ( ,J cHi u Ell''' 'j" :L c;, '7 El) ::
,:'1 1"',d
dnd
p.
26New England Fishery
Recommendations for Groundfish
CJul y :28~ 1.l:)7~3, p , 1,,,, :3.. ) ..
l'1an <:'1(:;) em(·?nt.
~1,::-'ln i:7I g E?ITISn t;
Counc:il~
Db j I:=?Ct i. Vi;,?~~~,
and such as a con sumer group or
a n e nv i r o n men ta l i s t For example~ a closed
increases th e f i x e d
reduces t h e suppl y of mar ket abl e f i s h , a nd
consumel,'· up.
theoreti call y p as s t h e e x tr a c o s t d ir ectl y t o the con sumer
be r elati vel y un af f ected . If t h e boat p r i c e is u p ,
the d ealers represented Dn Counci l
j us t: if -y' c=l markup 50 they will n ot oppose a closed
se a son on c on s umer grounds.
{-i n Dt h E?r q o a I san d c omme-rc i a l
goals conflicting i s seen in the con fli ct o ver employment
l ab or s aving t echnol og y. If a n ew, labor saving device
the ,-- €-?ducti o n in r a w p r o duc t c ost s woul d
t; I -~ E' C' I~ I-~-' J t: i (_. 0) ] 1 -"I • _ __. .,.. .. __• c_. _ . y t h c';.? c: o r1 ~s u me i'- mDn ey~ bu t th e los s o f
employment would not please the fishermen. F Ol~ I;:?;' : <':i mp 1 e ~
on t he United S tates West Coast~ th e Pacif ic s a l mo n r e t u r n
home ri vers where o n e s tr a tegicall y p lac e d trap
c oul cj capture the optimum c atch i n eac h s t r eam wi t h v e r y
and Ho we ver , it was dete rmined
I:h at t h f2 t.ra d i t:i. ori.a l -f :i. ~5 1l E:r IHf?ll
h a \I E? l i tt le a l ter n ative e mploy men t a n d the y wo u l d
b c-:~ cDme t _hf:? s;tat E: • .1.']. r
p t-?r-il1i . tt ~~d .. Therefore the traps were prohibit ed, and the
fisher me n c ont i n u e t D capture t he s a lmon inef fi c ientl y ..
restr ict ion s on t e ch n olog y (p robabl y t he
0 1 d €-~st. t. f?chn :i. qUE:! ) range f r om th e sa i l p ow e r e d
boa ts on the Ch esapeake Bay to th e hand p o we re d
c 1 aci'l l"I'::i. i n t·~ " ju.·::.ti. -fiE:.id th ~~se
1"'f':>S;tl"ictiDns on the basis of stock conservation, because
i. of e-r +i.ci€~nt har vesting method were universally
WDuld b e d e p l e t e d . However, th e r eal
is the managers' i.nabilit y to deal with the social
uphe'::lv ell by the unemployment of a large number of
who could operate if the new
technolog y were permitted. Hi stclt"-ic:all\i, in t(:-lchnolc)(;JY
versus employment conflicts where there i s governmental
m<::~rlc::\qemE~nt, t:.h('~ considerations o verride
harvesting efficiency.
COMMERCIAL FISHING OBJECTIVES
n ccor-d i ng t o the New Engl and Council,
"manag€'?iTl,::::'nt 's ul.t:lm..;~te aim to generate t he greatest
(·?CClnDm:i. C v a l u e s to the users of the
One of the purposes stated in the FCMA is to
domest i c arid
u.nder sou.nd conservation and management: p r t nc i p l e s , 1'2E:~
From this statement :i.t is clear that the commer ci al and
fishermen are classes of indi viduals wh o h a ve
a special interest in conservation and management.
The 1 o st <:;Clfnl:::" i mpDrt.::\nt.
e:\estheti. c f.:> c CJ rlOil1 i c v a l u e s when they curtailed their
fishing in order to comply with the FCMA .
27New England
Recommendations for
(.Ju l v 2[3, 1(:':07B, p , 1. .. i ,
Fi sher' y
81'-Dun d f i,,;I''',
1"1 i=.\n ~i.(.:Jf?ment
1"1 eEl. n ag (;?iTl~::.'nt
Cuul-,ci1,
Db j "::.'<':: t i. V ~2~;~,
EIE's th(~t i c b y f ish e r me n a re s u c h things as
IJE·auti ··Ful sun ·set·:; an d dynamic weather and sea
cond itions p roviding challenge a nd v a r i e ty to t h e job ~ t h e
hunters skill in find ing his c atch~ and the seclusion f rom
s o c i e ty f orcing sel f- suf f ici enc y .
\
Th e c los u r es and quotas
have also restricted the fi shermen"s f r e e d o m to make
busin e s s dec i s i ons to ma ximize th e ir i nc omes.
led to some marginal operators loosing their li velih oods
anel ha s o t h erf i !:5 h e r mE!n
government-backed economic protection.
in the traditional f i s h e r y before the 200
l:i.mit~, the f ishermen competed with e ach other
'f o r f i sh Elnd
b an kr up t , Mqst f i s h e rme n enjoy competing with each other~
but regulations that
oppol·-tun :ity to and comp ete tAli t h
l ike p oop I f? in any Clther f r e e e nt e r pr ise
i nd u str-y , deman cj to (Jo ban kr up t; c.'S U d i;? e d
personal ability. From a commerci al fi shing point
o f \li e w ~ an ideal management technique would protect the
from o ver-expl oi ta ti on l e a v e the t radit i o n a l
s o c ia l a n d economic structure intact.
PROCESSOR OBJ ECT IVES
qroup ori U ,s
is t he f i s h p rocessors or dealers.
in management bec ause t he i r busine s ses n eed a
con ·st.ant 'o, u p p l''Y of .q u aLi t v f i5h in to min i mi z e
CDst~:; iO\ n cl s upp ly cust Dmers. i t: i ~:;
sometimes desirable for
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an industr y to reduce the s u p p l y
so that the demand will force the price up. For instance,
the Mid-Atlantic Council has limited entry, trip catch
limits,
industry.
and one da y a week trips restricting the surf clam
This was supposedl y done to conserve the
stocks, but most of the surf cl am beds have never been
harvested in New England. In effect and by design the
r e g u l a t i o n s prohibit the development of the New England
resource because the increase i n supply would drop the
dealers) price.
fishermen opposed
As a matter of record~ the independent
these regulations but the Mid-Atlantic
Council ha~ enough dealers to push the regulatIons
through. From a dealer's per5pective~ any management plan
which maximizes dealers profit s is a g ood one.
RECREATON OBJECTIVES
A fourth special interest group that has some
conflicting goals both with the commercial industr y and
the consumer s is the r e c r e a t i o n a l fisherman. The
recreational fishermen are a ver y difficult group to
regulate because historical catch records a r e
non-existent~ and no one knows how much fish they catch.
To compl icate matters~ the v a l u e of fishing to
recreational fishermen is quite a bit more nebulous.
For example, what is a day on the wa ter aw a y from his
business worth to a business e xecutive? How many
recreational fishermen should be allowed to fish in
c o mp e t it i o n with the commercial fishermen? In other
words, if the commerc ial fi shermen are r estricted, should
the recreational f i s h e r me n be restricted, and if so, how ?
An ideal managemen t techniq~e would allow first come first
between th e recreational a n d commercial
fishermen and still prevent over-fishing.
THE POLITICS OF OBJECTIVES
Inst :i t u t i nl:;) cl c10seel i ~:; p ol I t :i. c ;::\ll 'y'
sensitive and could be discriminatory. Fishermen from one
state who catch f i ~:; h only when it is spawni ng could be
"qual i 'f i eel incli vidual-::;"
want to conser ve the s t o c k by closing all s p a wn i n g areas.
[Alhen th,=, inan ag emt~n t Db j ,,:~c t i ve s ar- e
the geograph y o f Council voting power becomes
k f"2y :i. ~:;SUE~. w1'1' r="J~t-rl ~C - t-j - 'I' t' - L ~C 1' 1-\ ' n -. .• •L ~V'"C'. _ ._ <,,_1 ,_ .• _ . L _> L t=.'
-:;tate V-li t h P t- i c ':.-::' t 0 fishermen in other states.
i f more than 50% of the Council members are
-states not a'f -F 'o'2c'l:f'?d by b y the closure , a
discriminator y closure could be a reality.
Her'e we see the possibility for discrimination.
] ' ,J:
, . the representati ves f rom Massachusetts and Rhode Island
inclined t.o , they could force a management decision
c o u l d be to the detrimen t of t h e other states in the
!:J':"2cause thei, to cornb i ned v o t e s control 64% o f t h e
CouricI 1 .
For instance, a law tha t c l o s e s the fi shing season on
cod from May to August for all f i s h e r me n would not
on the s u r f ace seem discrimin atory because it would appl y
tn all fish ermen. But practic all y~ i t would e xclude Maine
New Hampshi~e fishe~men on an economic basis~ SInce
this is the time when cod run offshore near these st a t e s .
The makeup of these Councils 15, therefore~ important when
manaq(·?mf.~nt. C:CH.l1 d discriminate between
residents of di fferent states a~e considered.
One o ·f the responsibilities of the Secreta~y of
Commel~ce men t i on E~c1 the previous chapter is; t.he
obligation the Standards are met by a
management plan. p rori i bi t:=:.
d 1 sc I" i rn ina t i. on basis of residenc y but as long as
the n?gi ori a l ~=+ of ec:t "i: hE~ manc\(:;)~?mE!nt
bal anc(;?d ~I o ver-Se(;?I" ':;; may ignore mo~e subtle
disc I" i in ina 1:: i ori • example, the New England
Cciunc iI has used closed spawning a~ea5 and closed seasons
have caused one group of fishermen economic hardship
and have only a minimal effect on other fishermen.
COI'-./CLUS I ON
The marlaqement objectives of the FCMA should be set
up , to only the utilization and conSer-\/atDn
a1 :5 0 trle all cic a t I on :i S SLl2S.
t"flc3.n c:.~g emen t ob j ec t; i.V IO? ~; '::; h o u l d include the following
el(-::!mE,mts: a minimum brood s t o ck s i z e ~ a percent age of the
the c ornrnarc i <3.1
·f: :i ~:;h ennen ~ a min imum e stimate of
c! ~:;sessrnent costs, and ~ determination o f
an acceptable inc~ease i.n consumer costs.
Th e New England Regional Fisheries Management Council
groundfish c o mmi t t e e addressed the question of g~oundfish
01:) j (~ct i ves pr: od uc ,~c.1
r f?C: DiYlrriE'!n clat i on s ~
The o verall o b j e ct ive of th e plan shall be
to generate over the period of the plan the
greatest possible join t e c o n o mi c and s o c i a l net
benefits from th e har v esting a n d utilization o f
the groundfish resource, ensuring that by the
end of the period the relevant groundfish s t o c k s
shall be in a condition which will produce
enhanced and relati vel y stable yields from the
ground fish fishery in future years28.
A f isheries management Qbjective is an aim or goal
that should benefit the consumer~ the fish stocks~ and/or
a special interest group. The motives of special interest
groups will contribute to the allocation procedures in the
mr.:\n a<;J emen t p l em s that E\/en if c\ p Le n
purports to be based on maintaining the Optimum Yi e l d but
is i n t e n d e d to discriminate economically againsf residents
o -f state's, it could be adopted by the Council
accepted by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce. Bcd anci n q
the c on Fl ic t i riq m·:::~n c,~g ,:,men t objectives makes
fisherie s management a di fficult political pr oc e ss.
2l3II:Jid~ pu2.
CHPIPTEFi I I I . CJF'T I l"IUI'1 '/ I ELD
The co~ne~stone of the FeNA is the requirement that
Council's management deliberations establish
F."\mount of harv8stable fish called the Opt imum
Yield f'~I'·· managed fishery29. "ThE' c oric ep t of
Optimum 'liE'ld than the consideration of only
t.h,:! ·:~ t O C k·5 of It takes into account the economic
the commercial fishermen, the i ntE?I"e5t !o; of
qual i. t Y and
i nt.:erE~st in and management of the
f i sh':?I'· i (.~ ~:.... " :30 fo lL DV·Ji nq ,j'2f i ni ti on of eJY i n -l:.:h,;e
Il\J:i. th i n,r Dr'mat.i CJn fr"Dm the
Leg i s 1at i \ l (;:; the Fishery Conservation
Manage/nent Act (~f 1976:
The term 'optimum', with respect to the y i e l d
from fishery, means the amount of fish that will
provide the greatest oYe~all benefit. tD the
nation, with particula~ reference to food
production and recreational opportunities; and
which is p~esc~ibed as such on th e basis of the
maximum sustainable y i l d f r o m such a fishery as
modified by any revelant economic, social, Dr
ecological factor.31
Optimum Yield is a concept which
::-:2 (:;' r c1'1 A :3m::.
management plans.
30Legislitive History. 1"'0 l09')'.r-
CCln1: (·2nt ·;::; of
considerabl e devel opment dur ing th e l egislative process
OY is defined as Maximum Sustain abl e
Vi E·I d ( 1···1 ~3Y t II f.~ largest averaqe annual cat ch) modi fied b y
€~con om i c ~ soc i .:~ 1 ~ E'col oq i C <:''1 1 ·f E\C t; C31'- ss • II.:
fr o m t h e d ef i n it ions i n b oth the Se na t e and
House bills that "Dpc i murn StE;tainable
Yiel cl~ II "Dpti murn Y i (:~ l d ' l <::\I~(,:,) th (,"~ ·3 a m2 c o n cep t , A::5 tl-,e
t i tl e of th is a c t st a t e s, the act's purpose · is 1.:0 conser ve
a nd man a ge th e f ish s t o c k s of f our coast s . ThE~ p r: i ric : i pl (·2
o f jG to provide a brood stoc k that wi ll
in p erpet u i t··'!" " This i s clo ne t o
l::Jelief i t; the humans who a r e and will be harvesting the
bE' iilo~-e appropr i a te th an t h e
by the e: hange in th e wordi n g o f t h e Sen ate bil l.
~3 (=-nat or- .,:; (·3. 1'1agnu.·;::;orl F .. Hall i l"1g ·:;
introduced Senat e bill 961 which stated t hat :
II Dp t i mum
I a n;;'H?s t
l:liCJl.ogical
d E~t (;:?t-m :i neel
ecoliCJmic~
f a ctm-·s :32 ..
S u stai n a b l e Yi£:,ld" n:e ·f e r- ~:; to tl-18
economic return consistent wi th the
cap ;~IJJ.lltlE'\S 0': the ·:;t oc: k, as
o n t h e b a si s o f all reve l an t
biological, a n d en vi ronment al
This def inition wa s l at er a men ded t o b e :
"Dpc i rnurn , II w i t h I··-I::·?·:;pec:t to th €:, ·/i E:~ lc:l -fl·- o m a
·f :i. ~.:; h f.?r y !, iTH? E'Irl S t: 1"1 f? <:H fi Cl u n t of +:i. ~".; h ( i:~ ) . (-i f") i ch i of
p r odu. ced~ will p ro v ide the gr eates t benefit to
..~
,._l ( :l. 8) De-f i n i t i o r.s
3 2 Le gis lati v e Hi story. p , ·/·51..
the Nation; and ( 8 ) wh ich is prescribed as such
by the a p pr o pori a t e Counc il a n d t he S e c r e t a ry o n
t he b asi s o f t he Maximum Sust ain able Yield f r o m
such a f i shery a s modi fied b y any r el e van t
e c o n o mi c , s o ci a l and / o r ec ol ogi cal f a c t o r s33 .
An import ant change in th e wo r di ng i s t he d ele t i on o f
'2co n o mi c and the substitution of BH~E:F;:- IT.
!A.l f?b st e r- :' 5 Col I f2i] i ;:1t: e D:i_ c t i Clfl ar-v cle f i n i2S "I~e turn ' .:\s II th ('2
v a l uie of fr o m a quani t y o f g o ods, consignmen t , or
carq o c:: o il"! i"ni n q in ex chanqe f o r q oods sent out as a
ITlel'· c an 'I.::i,I (e '..' (~ n t u l'- €~ . "
t o mCJn E~ti:il~ "! t (,::::'r f!l!S. is d ef ined b y Web ster' s,
Clf?nef i t
Therefore the change o f RETURN
tD e x pa n ds the concept elf DY to in cl ud e
nonmonetar y v a l u e s such as hea lth a nd ha p piness.
';:; i iJ i n+ i cant ChC:U1Cjf2 th e defin i ti on of OY
is t h e addition II '5 0 C: j_al " :Ln list o f modi fying
fi:iC"t:.Cll'-',=;. Web s ter' s defi ne s II ':5 0 C i ,3.1 II
r-e1 a ti nl~J to th,=-, the
,LI"-,d i v i du a l
IT"=-'mb /,~ 1'-· S (-0 -("
Or the we lf are o f human b eing s
e x ample, from a 5trictl y
bi 01 CJ i~l :L c al th €:? hf?,..-r--i ng saidinss shou ld h~
all Dv~/:?d to mature so that t:h €~ ITla > ~ i mum (r~? i qht co u l d b e
c a u q ht; , If ~ f ish e ri es man agemen t plan prohibit s the
c)·f juvenile herring,fishing and eating habits
woul d q e t; '::ill IJLIt t el~ ,~~ i:sh
lAJi t hOLI t b u v i ng it dCHne!5'l:i Ceil I y" First, the fishermen who
have b0?en sst; o p "·'se I n i n C] the herring or sardines would no
I em i.;) £2r" have employment. consumers in the U.S.
the juvenile herring to the adults, so their eating
h ab it '=:, l,,",oul d I::J (~ mod i -r i E~d • Because of these factors, the
plans will probably continue to
capture of juvenile herring as well as adults.
I ast; in the wording of the definition of
DY ~-efTIovf?d "biolClqical" ' 1~ lr ' O ill 'LI'''Je Li tst; Clf modify:iI'1(;) fi:\ctor!5
and added f/lSV '::'1 '5 the b t ol oq i c a l bast-s o "F I]Y. The f'ISY i ':; a
"~ en- the long-term average harvest from a fishery.
it only needs updating on a y e a r l y basis and is
IlDt clfE'pendent: on thf? CUFTent the stDc:k" The
modifications of the 0',1 definition make it clear that only
thi~ MSY :5houl d be used for the base of OY.
sc i en t i, fie ev1, dencE? must be used to establish
MSY, but only MSY can be used as a base for 0',1.
If COn,~rE?S,S had biological factc'l~'5 to b\~
in 'Lhe determination of OY they would have kept
a 's a mod i Fvi n q In ',;tE'd!, C::ongrl':~ss
ilicludf:2S; Il-Jhic:h :i s a I:Jn::Jade~-" ten!).
,:-:ldcj i '1:: ion Clf e xpands the concept Clf OV even
+UI·' t j'j er' i::ll'1 cl it
.
more flex~ble because the Councils
ca.rl legally consider more environmental i rnp iae:t ':5 .
a dredging operation, for harVEsting shell~lsh,
c.oul d accelerate erosion of adjacent beaches" 1+ t I·') E? j',1SY
thE~ s;hellfish 1;~<:iS not
b i 010(:.1 i cal {Dr prohibiting the dredging. 1..·1 (J III e \i (02 I'· ,
i .-.
_ ::> ecological
pr: ob 1 (·?m v·.Jh i c: I"·, may require the prohibition of dredging.
Th(-=:· i ncl u s i on (Jf insted o·f BIOLOGICAL.. as a
modifying factor OY gives the Regional Council the
flex~bility to deal with this type of Issue.
The definition Opti mum Y i Ed d in the House bill
number 200 stated that:
t €,!t""ill "CJp t: i mum !3ust 10\ in l:·\!::l 1 e Yi e1 d ,. mean S c:i
which provides the greatest benefit to the
States as determined on the basis of the
Sustainable Yield of a stock or stocks
as modified by relevant ecological,
economic, and social factors34.
The
v I o Ld
Un i teel
t·1a:·; i. mUlTI
Clf of ish
When these bills were
the definition of Optimum
combined and passed
Yi E~l d cl"jan l;)'2cj:
i n t o 1 a~\i
TI·"lf.~ t.e:·!nn "Up t.i mum Yi (?ol d," tAli tl· ·j n::!spect: "1.::0 "I::I-Ie
y i e l d from a fishery, means the amount of fish-
(A) which will provide the greatest overall
benefit to the nation, with particular reference
to food production and recreational
opportunities, and
(8) which is prescribed as such on the basis of
the Maximum Sustainable Yield from such fishery,
as modiFied by any relevant economic, social, or
ecological factor35.
The c·ldcli ti on of II f Dod pr: o d uc t:l cin "
to the definition of [lY
specifies that both marine fi shing acti vities have equal
:::::L\. I b:i. d , p , 1 ::~; 1. "
35FCMA Sec. 0 (18l
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impo~tance. In the report of the Senate committee of
c o mme rc e the~e
Optimum Yi e l d .
is a clarificat ion of the c oncep t
In the past~ most fishery management has sou g h t
to achieve the ma ximum sustainable yield from a
fisher y. The max imum yield (primarily a
biological term) is achieved when the annual
catch from a f ish e ry is at the highest level
wi t h o u t ha~ming the ~ep~oductive abilit y of the
stock and which assures a 5imil a~ level o f
ha~ vest in the next yea ~ . However~ many expe~ts
b~lieve that use of the maximum sustainable
y i e l d objective in fishe~ies management ma y lead
to substantial economic waste and ma y ignore
important environmental ~elationships between
stocks from which yields can not be maximized
simultaneousl y. It seems more desirable
therefore to adopt the objective of optimum
y i e l d ~ defined to include the maximum yield as
the basic standard of reference~ as modified by
~elevant economic, social~ and/o~ ecological
factors. However~ the Committee does no t intend
that these modif ying f actors would be used to
i n s t i t u t e management measures which permit
overfishing on a continued basis. Although it
ma y be conceivable that a situation may occur in
which a yield higher that the maximum
sustainable might be defensible~ t h i s would seem
ra~e and should be only temporary. In almost
every other in5tance~ the optimum y i e l d sh ould
b~ equal to o~ below the maximum sustainable
y ie l d . It i s intended that determining the
optimum y i e l d fo~ each f i sh e~ y ought to be
within the di sc~etionary p o wers o f the Councils
and the Secreta~y36.
The House Commi ttee on Merchant Marin e and Fisheries
submitted
Yield:
the following discussion o f Optimum Sustainable
Th e pr eceding c oncept s r elate to the biological
wellbeing of the fishe~~. The concept of
optimum sustainable y i e l d 1 5~ however~ broader
36Legislati v8 Hi5to~y.
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than the consideration of the f i s h stocks and
takes into account the economic wellbeing of the
commercial fishermen, the interests of
recreational f ish e r me n , a n d the welfare of the
nation and its consumers. The optimum
sustainable yield of any given fi shery or region
will be a carefully defined deviation from MSY
in order to respond to the unique problem of
that fishery or region. It can not be defined
absolu~y for all s t o c k s of fi sh or groups of
fishermen, and will require careful monitoring
by the Regional Marine Fisheries Councils and
the Secretary of Commerce. While optimum
sustainable yield may have many complex
components, theif quantification should not be
beyond the capability of the broad range of
individuals who will serve on the Councils,
supported by trained economists and marine
biologists. Opt imum sustainable yield will, as
indicated above, employ a well understood and
time-prov~n concept of ma ximum sustainable yield
as its basis while allowing for other relevant
economic and social inputs. The Committee
believes that the careful balanc ing of roles and
responsibilities under the Act between the
Councils~ the Secretary and the public will
ensure that these inputs are not distorted and
that optimum sustainable yield will achieve the
purposes of the Act37.
The concept of OY was in vented during
deliberations of the U.S. Legislature. The MSY was found
to be too restricitve in its definition to allow
flexability in the fisheries managemen't plans. Therefore,
the sole biologi cal b asis o f OY i s MSY. OY, however~
includes modi fiers to e xpand the scope of the Regional
Council "s deliberations. The concept of Optimum Yield was
gi ven statutory recognition because it allows flexibility
in the process o f d etermin ing what amount of fish can be
reasonabl y removed from the fish s t o c k without harming its
r eproduct ive c apaci ty.
In p ract ice ~ the c o mp lex compon ents o f Optimum Yi e l d
the abilities o f the broad r ange of
indi vidual s wh o have ser ved on the Counc ils. Co ri F l L c t t n q
special interests groups on the Councils and the
ambi guous interpret ati ons of t h e relat ionsh ip between the
Maximum S u s t a i n a b l e Yi e l d and OY have contributed to the
difficulties experienced in instituting th e FCMA.
OY is not intrinsicall y a discriminator y concept, but
the p ol i ti ca l proces s of d etermining it :i. !5 op ori t o
ITI,:l.n i P u l at i on • For example~ the Council wanted to exclude
foreign fishing of butterf ish. Accor di ng to , th e FCMA any
portion of the OY not caught domesticall y must be assigned
t. o t h('? To ta l Allowable Level o f Foreign F ish in g (TALFF).
In order to r e d uc e th e TALFF t h e OY was set just above the
e xpect ed dom~5ti c c a t c h l eav in g o n ly a s ma l l TALFF. The
mar ket for butter fish i~ almost ent irel y fore ign ~ s o i f
the foreign demand could be filled b y foreign fishin g o ff
o u r c oasts there would be no domestic har vest. 'II")E?r- t'? h C':\ S
not b een a cl e ar domest i c e xampl e o f discriminat ion c aused
s o l e ly by the select ion o f the OY but a similar si tuati on
c ou l d OC::CUt-·.
The cho:i. C f? o f tools tD implement a Fi sheries
(FI'1F') is directl y rel ated to the OY, the
amount of f ish the Counc il in t ends to b e c au~ht . A 1 C) W 0'/
leads t o all oc ation
d i 5 1: 1'- i ITI:i. n at; ion. a low OY could be c h o sen t o f orc e
other memb er s of the Council t o a g r e e to di sc rim inator y
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management techneques to be included in a FMP. In either
situation th e MSY is the s ale biol ogical b a s is f o r OY
prescribed in the FCMA. The biolgical methods for
establishing the MSY become important because if members
o f the Council want to manipulate the outcome of the OY
deliber~tions they must manipulate the MS Y.
chapter ex p l a i ns the biological basis of MSY.
The next
CHAPTER IV. MA XIMUM SUSTAINABLE YIELD
Maximum S u s t a in a b l e Yie l d (MSY ) , the sole basi s for
15 a biolog ical concep t which is not full y defined in
For. instance, the a c c e pt a b le conf iden ce l imit s
of MSY were n ot defin ed, and the rel ation s hip o f MS Y to
one species or the whole biomass was not specified. I n
Register under Guidence f o r Regional Fi shery
Management Councils NOAA stated that:
Th e MSY f r o m a f isher y i s the largest a verage
annual catch or y i e l d in terms of weight o f f ish
caugh t b y both c ommerci al a n d recreational
fi shermen that can be taken continuously fro m a
stock under e x ist i n g en v ir o n me nta l c o n d i tions.
A determination o f MSY , which should b e an
estimate b a sed u pon t h~ best sc ientific
in formati on avai l a b l e is a biological measure
necssar y in the development of Opti mu m Yield38.
It is necessaF y to underst and the collec t ion proc e ss
for the
the OY to the MSY are to be comprehended.
The Ma xi mum S us ta i nab le Yi e l d i s a c o mp l i c a t e d f i g u r e to
bu t; t h e theor y beh ind i. t; is quite simple.
Fir s t t he fis h e ry scient i sts f i g ure o u t ho w ma ny f ish
ex i s t in a st oc k and how muc h e f f or t i s needed to catch
t h sf i ~:; h • F rom these a graph c a n b e p roduced s howin g the
38Un ited Stat es Dep ar t ment o f Commerce , Na ti onal
Oceanic a n d Atmospheric Administration. Gu i d e n ce f o r
\- . 1 1- · ... 11.:.'I-I c:-·l~.' 0_ 1··' ·1 e·r'lt; C (:J \.\ n c 1· I c::_~. ( Tu e- ~;d E:\ \,_' , \.~f u l \./ I;:"~eglona - ls, ls r y -, ,= ~ ,
197"7 ) . p , :::::44=.;8.
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optimum e f for t for the max imum catch. A low MSY res u l ts
i na I o w el), • A l ow 0 )' r esult s in s h o rt ag es in allowab le
A low h a r vest r esu lt s in allocation and econom ic
d i sct-·i rni nat.i o ri , If f i s h e r i e s manag ement i s to av o i d
the stoc k Est imate must be impeccab le.
Th e fol lowing is a discuss ion o f how MS)' is det ermined.
For each spec ies the total p opulation of fish is
called the stock. The stock constantl y f l u c t ua t e s , due in
,
part to the entrance of young f i s h called recruits. Th€~se
along with the other more matur e f ish , grow w it~
t i me a nd increase the total weight of the s t o c k .
s(~me, t ime t h e r e are f ish dying f r o m old a ge or b ei n g
12a t e n b y
di s t ingui shed f rom the f ish t ha t die b e c ause t he y a re
c aught b y man. (f i l;J u l~ e on e )
VI RTUAL POPULATI ON ANALYSI S
In order to harvest f i s h and conser ve a brood stoc k
the magnitude of recruitment, growth, natural mortalit y,
and fishing mortality must be kn own (f i g u r e one ) . Th e
f i shing mort a lity can be estimated using the commercial
l an d ing stati stic s f o r d at a . The NMFS co l lects s a mpli ng
st a t isti cs o n the age o f t h e landed fi s h b y c o u n t i n g t h e
number o f g r o wt h ri n gs on fis h s c ales . Th e numb er o f f ish
D:f l' C ·-, estima ted usin g l eng t h /fr equency
d at a, . Ov er th e life span o f each a g e c ra s s t he num b er of
fish r e moved b y c o mme r c i a l f i sh ing c an be total led . Th i ~;
process i s c alled cohort a na l ys i s or v ir t ua l pop u l a t io n
anal ysi s and a ssu mes t hat i f t h e fi sh we re c aug h t b y the
fishermen they must
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in the first y e a r of
Figure two gi ves an e xample o f a v i r t u a l population
clarifies this part of stock assessment. In J.920 a
unknown number" of fishcrats were borne. Because
c:d 1 y o u n .:] f i shclrc::\ "ts look like Elll other- juvin:i.l~?·s ~'!e
c arm o t; t<-2ll which ones will b e fi shcrats. Theref C:Jr~?, t,,,e
canriot; simply count juv4niles to determine the number who
will become fishcrats. But if we record the number of
f i ':;h c lra t s eacl-", y e a r from the 1920 year class, as 1S
in labelled (LANDED) in figure two, we can
total thE-? ·f i 'shcrats landed each year. Common sense
tell s us that if they died, they must have been there in
The total
In 1921 there must ha ve been at least
32 f i s h c r a t s alive. Two fishcrats died in 1922 leaving at
I i~ast the end o·f 1 (" )', ,",i k":" . The pattern is followed
I ab e I J ed (":EI'1I~ IN) • The graph below the
table shows graphically the virtual population always will
then populdti.on because the landing
stati stics cannot be u sed to estimate natural mortality.
'v'i rt.u a l population .:~nal y s i s is based on 1:he
assumpt ion t.h a t; the c at c h ,:;1:i",-ti s;ti CiS must. be "-\"::!c\SOlli",bl 'y"
aCCUI'"ate and that the n at ur-aI kno~\jn or
(~st i iTli::lt.clb 1 e. 'Also C\ true estimate of fishing ef fort is
neeejecj as the tIme seri.es progresses, and th e biological
characteristics such as length to age, growth rates, etc
must kriown .. These a.ssumptions are questioned b y the
c: oeHmel'- C: i al know from e xpe r ience
t. h at; t h e catc h st a ti s tics a r e incorrect.
was once unloadi ng a b oat f ull o f whiting when the captain
was i ntervi ewe d by a NMFS d ata co l lec tor .
not ITlent i on his whiting catch to the collector.
NMFS man left , all the fisherman had a good laugh; however
tlli=:! f<~ lse in formation was dutifull y entered into the d ata
t od ay for ms t h e stat i st ic s f o r 1'15Y .. The
cd ',;0 quest i on the a ccur ac y of a ny estimate o f
They kn o w that a s mal l c han ge i n f i shin g
g eew can have tremendous consequences an -C. I'-Ie ca tch.
Tllerf2f or e they c o n c l u d e an y estimate for (·2f·f en- t. (J I~
potent i al e f fort is lud icr o us.
l,~hi 1 (2 th (2r E' i s general a greeme n t a b o ut t h e patterns
of growth used in calculating the v ir t ua l p opu l a t i on ~ the
s p e c i f i cs are difficult e xpensi ve to documen t ..
i t k ri o wn if the adults which eat the
as t h e recruit s are r emov ed ~ the recrui ts g row
faster--presumabl y because th e y have more f o o d ..
class i s e xc e ptionall y l ar g e, t he individ ua ls wi ll
J
grow sl owl y and mature late. In this c ase~ e a r ly har vest
is l i ke t h i n n i n g
b e tter- " t he 0 '/
s o t h e sur vivor s c an gr ow
i n time would permit the early
cnan ag ':21Ti'::? Il t a nd
1 E~cl to di scriminator y closu res. I~: or
·,::; u p p o rt; e d l ar g e s u mmer fis hery in Maine.
conducted
by the NMFS because before the winter fishery
by Rhode Island fishermen was started the entire
OY was taken in Maine.
If class 15 followed through its life c ycle,
of individuals is very high at first, but they
are rapidl y eaten or die for other reasons.
q(;?t they die at a slower rate. The weight of each
f j. '5h is 1]I..I.t \/ o u n q
r ap i cl l v until
fish in the year class, the result i s the total
t-J€;!i qh t;
numb E!r
of <~ fish in a year class is ~ultiplied by the
o··F the three shows these
relationships graphically.
One problem with virtual population analysis still
after specie"s bioloqy is established and
the errors from inprecise 5tati sti.cs have been addressed.
Th:is s;'t(Jck a~-;sl,~ssment method can only be donE on a y e a r
has already been caught or died.
p op u l at i on analysis can be used as a check on the
~:;t.oc k methods that estimate the present
abundance of fish.
IS u sed by the NMFS to estimate the present
abundancae of fish.
The area swept clean method assumes that a biologi st
can tow a standard net through the grounds, that the fish
are e venly distributed over the bottom, and that his net
catches every fish which is in its path. The total numb er
•• r
'-JT in the stock can be calculated b y multiplying the
tOt.EII the fishing grounds by the amount of fish
cauqht unit sv,lept F i (] U.I'- .? -f a ur:
depicts t.he process of
swept clean method.
!:;tock assessment. using the area
o- an',!, ~5tucly is onl y as good its
as':;umpti,ons. i:,r-e not evenly distributed over the
'f :i. shi n q grounds and if only one tow were used the results
li,IOU I d be totally false.
theorem from statistics states that. the a verage of an
.,
nurnb er of random samples of a norrr e n d om
population is the average of
that large number of random tows must be made in
to mitigate the errors introduced b y the a s s u mp t i o n
that are evenl y distributed O\/el'- th,;:? bot t om ,
F :i. Sll ~?~-men at the number of samples used b y the NMFS
as the basis of 'thei I" data colection because they know
moving onl y one hundred yards will sometimes triple
catch. In ':~tatist..:i.cal tel'-ms, the fishermen are
that ti (:::JhtE~I~
conceiltl'-clti on thf?n the NMFS statistics show.
the random samples made by the NMFS almost never
concentrations of fj.st-I, . acc:olo·,.jing tes
P 1'-0+ ('?S'5:i. on ,:\ I The scienti sts an swer this charge
by stating that the centeral limit theorem requires that,
if the results are to be of any value, they must sample
randoml y and u.se the average concentration. At t.h i a po in t;
the scientist's credibilit y i s s o low that the fishermen
are certin
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that if a man were st anding with one foot on a
block of dr y i ce and the other foot in a bed of hot coals~
the scientists would say t h a t , on the a verage, the man was
comfortable.
Commercial fi shermen would also disagree wi th the
assumption that all the fish in f r o n t of the net are
caught. For instance, a fisherman from Point Judith Rhode
Island was fishing for butterfish alongside a group of
boats and catch ing about four thousand pounds per tow. He
then adjusted the sweep on the net by three inches (less
than three tenths o f one perent) and caught thirt y
thousand pounds in the next tow. The other boats
con tinued to catch about four thousand pounds per tow.
Fish catch rates are a function of the gear, the operating
environment~ and the operator's skill. However, the
fishery scientist counters this charge by pointing out
that the trawl survey is compared against the v i r t u a l
population analysis to arri ve at an i n d e x of sampling
efficiency. In other words, the f isher y scientist is
saying that the commercial catch rates are used to check
or correct the results of the survey.
VIRTUAL POPULATION VERSIS AREA SWEPT CLEAN
The NMFS uses the v i r t u a l population anal ysis of past
,
year classes that had the same stock assessment level to
say t h a t there are the same number of fish available for
f u t u r e har vest as were available in the historical or
v i r t u a l population. Put another wa y, the area swept clean
survey i s used onl y to determine the relative abundance
o:;.ssu.mE?d t 0 €? >: t ~; t: tod c~v . This type of correlatton redu.ces
the objections to the assumptions in the area swept clean
of s;'t.:CJC k if is done
prec isely the s ame way e a c h y e a r .
Fisheries biologi sts also estimate the future stock
by c omputi n~J thi? amount; of growth there will be in the
stock~ t h e amoun t of recruitment~ the fishing mortality~
the age ratios~ and the size of the brood stock necessary
to ensure a new year class. In fact~ the computer models
are now being modified to include sociological data on the
to estimate their responses to
management plans. When these complex computer models are '
c omp Le t e , the fisheries managers will 1"1 a ve an on .._J. in e ~
real-time management SyStf?n1 that sh ou l cl I:J e
c ap ab l e of an "/ quest ion , Many fishermen feel
that. modeling is a means to a secure future for
the s c ien t i st s and statisticians, because if the computer
if then? is a God it lr,lould answel~, "Th(2re is
notA/." The average fisherman is not capable of e valuating
the p re-c i ~:;i ori the applicability of these assessment
ITIFthods 01'· th0? COl11put€~r· software used to manipulate it.
judging
assumptions made in ol~del'- to conduct stock assessments,
they generally disbelieve the scientific evidence.
FISHING EFFORT AND YIELD
the 1It':?::-:"!.:
the size of the fish stock has been e5timated~
in determining MSV is to determine how the
is related to fishing effDrt. The sci~?ntific
assumption
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is that the stock s iz e IS equal to the f i shing
effort times a constant. Th is means if there are more
f i s h in the sea~ the f i s h e r me n will catch more fish f o r
his ef fort and, con versely, the fewer the fish the lower
the c a t c h . This seems to be a logical statement but the
underlying
e xplored.
assumption of catch per unit e f fort must be
The number of vessels fishing times the number of
days fished is an estimate of effort exerted. In order to
make this calculation , the statisticians assume that all
fishing boats are the same size with the same power; that
the boats all tow the same size net en identical fishing
ground with random fish density; that the net is towed the
same number o f hours e very day fished; and that the
0-
cap~in5 and c r e ws are identical . Even a casual o bserver
can see this is not correct~ 50 the statistician creates a
formula to account for as man y factor s as possable.
However, fishermen point out that the human fact ors alone
can o vershadow any vessel factor. A vessel ma y be an
e xceUent producer in a fishery in one area but ma y be
uncompet itiv8 in another area or fi shery.
After the scientists calculate the amount o f ef fort
exer ted by the recreation al and c o mme r c ia l f ishermen~ they
need to . know the y ield or amount of f i s h caught b y this
effort. Thi s data is collected by NMFS data taker s a t th e
port or is reported by the dealers. The r eliab ilit y of
these figures in r eflecting the r eal c atch level i s b ased
on a number of a5sumptions~ that there are no f ish so ld
off that is no
taken out of the l anding f i g u r e r eported; that
the scales used to weigh the f i s h are accuratel y operated
person; that all the fi sh unloaded f r o m the
boats are recorded; that the fish species is correctly
r:1.nd that there is no discarding at sea. Again~
know from experience that these assumptions
do not reflect the real world. Yet this data is the basis
-Fc:II~ "thi;:> bt~st sc:i.entifi.c evid,=:,nc:e. II
The effort/yield function (f i g u r e five) i s t h e r esult
of the statistics on stoc k size, effort, and
catch This t ype of relationsh ip between catch and
15 not unique to fish populations. It is f ouridin
all 12::{ p 1 CJi t E~ c1 nat.ural population s such as a deer herds.
This unique situation having the population hidden
below the surface of the sea creates more errors in the
c o Ll eet i. on o·f data. The error in fish stock assessments
is the s u m of· the error caused b y inaccurate assumptions
and in data collection systems.
example the 9 5 % confidence
ql~aphed i n f i. q L.lr G:' ·S 1 ;. ~ • The plus or minus 50% may seem
but it is a v e r y good fish stock
as·:;eSSIT.c-?nt that can boast In 1 a ymcH1 ;':;
t er ms ~ thi s means that if the catch of fish were wat ched
for one hundred years, the catch would vary plus and minus
50% for nint y -five of those years. Insted of r ecommending
t.h at; the NMF S data be ignored because of the imprecision,
thE' f i s h e r me r1 s h o u l d realize that i f t h e stati stician and
fi shery biologi st can give the confidence interval of the
as;-::.,;:'SSfilerlt !I they have done the best job possible with t h e
THE POLITICS OF SCIENCE
This process o f e stabli shing the effort/yield graph
'\
and the MSY should be a purel y scientifi c p~ocess devoid
o f bi as and politics. "t.IIF.::' Nationi:d 1'1,,"!t-oine
Fisheries Ser vice is .•• in a s t r a t e g i c a l l y ad vantageous
pos ition to become the p rimar y source of data which the
c oun c t Ls need to t~ ~; t ab l i ~; r·1 j'lI2::Y.":3Cf The i=°C~!IA
requires that the MSY be established usin g the best
scientific e v i d e n c e available~ and in most case5~ the NMFS
has the onl y scienti fic data. Therefore~ the NMFS has the
best scientific e viden ce. The n :?qi on al c ouric iLa ar-°e
respons~ble f o r e stabli shing the OY . The FCMA defines OY
l'1 i:\ ;.dmum Sustiainab1e Yi(o?ld ..• "!.~o MSY is therefore the
starting point for DV.
council Richard Hennemouth, the then assistant
di rector o f the NMFS Fisheries Center of Woods Ho l e ,
~=. ·t a t ed that.
e;.: i. s t ·5. "4 1
purposes, MSV no longer
This statement is at the b ase of many o f. the probl ems
3 C1.John E. l<e11 (~ y • "Cln;)an i z at i ell! ,::'II E;t nJc ·l:ur E~ ,,"iln d
Concep t; LI~11 FI" <:1mt~~'4el·- k II ro1a l'"i. n E? F'e 1 :io c: y ( ,J an u ar y :L C?7B). P 34"
40FCMA Sec. 3 (18) . De finitions
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between the councils and the NMFS. It indicates that the
scientists are basing their management reccommendations on
theories which are one step beyond the concept of MSY.
The scientific
to establish
data that they have collected can be used
the average catch of fish from the stock, or
can be used to estimate the current }evel of stock.
Assuming there IS an optimum brood stock level, the
scientist can also calculate the best level of removal
from fishing. This shift in data interpretation is a
shift i II theory from maintaining a maximum catch to
maintaining an acceptable level of brood stock. The
fishermen want a maximum catch and the biologists are not
giving MSY calculations any credibility because MSY does
not agree with their current theory of fisheries
management.
The ultimate objective or result of the regional
council's management deliberations is the establishment of
the OY for each species in the fishery. However, to
establish OV, the MSV must be established. Given the wide
confidence intervals, or large error in the MSV, it is not
difficult to understand the confusion when the regional
councils deliberate the social, political, economic, and
environmental modifications to a hotly conte~ted MSV.
The MSY for a fishery is usually contested because a
41Richard Hennamith. New
Meeting, Peabody Massasachusetts
England Regional Council
March 10, 1977.
low MSY creates a
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low starting point for the OY. This
leads to a low DY, which the industry dislikes because it
restricts fishing. When fishing is restricted, there is a
potential for discrimination against residents of
different states. For example, the peak fIshIng season
occurs during different months for different states. When
a low MSY has led to a low OY and a closure of fishin~ is
ordered, the residents of the state that has its normal
fishing peak concurrent with the closure IS hurt
economicaly more than fishermen of other states.
I.J
V.
1::'-/'"
,.JL.
MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES~
ECONOMICS OF THE INDUSTRY
The c ommer c i ",d fishermen continue their objections to
the economic research done on the fishing industry.
:i ~3 I:J ec .:\Llse t .h e i?C on om i !5t '5 (.::i~?n !;-~r-.=\]. 1 y i:";\S!=;urnE:~ t. hat thE! f i ';5h
single ownership that the biologists can
fDI~rnLllate an accurate relationship IJ.::?t.ween catch
(?·f f ort . The credibility of the economist is so low in the
fishermen's eyes that they like to relate the story about
tile chemi st, physi ci !5t, and and economist s t r a n d e d on a
They had but one can of beans to eat and no
opening the can. The chemist remarked, as the
c ou l d
mounted, t.h a t; "i f I/'J~~ coul d app l Y Ileat to tlli':' can ~I I
calculate the coefficient of thermal expansion and
it burst open. II II Well, II tile
ph v s i c i st, II I can start a fire with my glass8s, and I can
calculate the trajectory of the beans in flight~ we could
catch them on
mU'sed I'I/·Je 0":11'- f:'? rna kin 9 this problem too
d i Li c u lt; ,
As the starting point for fisher y economic, theory
the ,'=cClrliJfTli 5'1;: i:\ssUmf?~S t.h a t; the stock assessment process
of catch-to-effort and that the
f i ·::;Il are owned by the government. As mentioned earlier,
at··,,~ hE::·ld :i.n b y the government for the
general public, and
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ownership does not start until the y
are caught. This ownership assumption leads the economi st
to the conclusion that r a t ion a l fish h ar vesting should be
based on the cheapest wa y to catch them , as if they were
owned by one owner. The fishermen, on the other hand,
point out that there are thousand s of fi shermen who
harvest the fish basing their decisions on individual
economic fac tors. An examination (Jf the industry
economics will
basic theor y.
clarify the points of conflict and the
INDUSTRY ECONOMICS
I I. order to examine the industry economics, i~ is
necessary to have a graph of catch pe~ unit effort, s uch
as the one shown in f igure f ive . The concept of ex-vessel
price IS introduced b y multiplying the price by the total
catch. If this is done for each point of the graph in
figure five, the results can
, be graphed showing the
relationship between revenue g enerated and the e ffort
necessary to generate it (figure seven).
In order to quantify the effort, the economist would
introduce the concept of standard vessels. All standard
vessels h ave the s a me s kipp er and crew~ the same power~
the same hull~ the same fishing gear; in short, eve ry
detail of the vessels is the same. The f i shi ng industr y
is assumed to be entirel y composed of standard v e s s e l s . A
fi sherman would be quick to point out this isn"t true, but
assume that through work and luck, it can be done. The
results c a n be graph ed (f igur e e i g h t ) u sing the ver t i c a l
v e s s e l s .
dollar s a n d
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the hori zontal axis f o r standard
EXPLOITATION OF A VIRGIN STOC K
The next graph shows an economist's v i e w of what
happens in a n industry when a v irgin stoc k o f fish is
e xploited for the first time. The older fish~ wh ich would
have been caught at an earlier time if the f ish e r y had
reached a steady state~ are immediately available f o r
harvest. Thi s will hold the catch rates tempor arily high~
50 the revenue curve also will be temoprarily be held
high. The extra revenue and profits will encourage
standard vessels to enter the fishery until the total cost
curve crosses the t emporary total revenue curve (point A
in figure nine). The longterm or steady-state catch curve
indicates that a management pl~n s hould have restricted
the number of fishing v e s s e l s to the long term requirement
for harvesting the MSY (in this case approximatel y one
hundred and twenty). An economist would then assert that
the same amount of f i s h could be harvested in the long run
and that society could use the extra capit al needed to
construct
investment.
the vessel s for an a lternati ve
The fishing industr y, although reluctant t o acc ep t
the economist's a~sumptions~ believes that in most cases
th e demand f o r fish and i n f l a t i o n has been inc reasing the
price. The total revenue curve will shift up when t h e
price incr"eases, because the value of t h e catch increases
(figu re ten). If the price increase 15 qreat enough, i t
will shift
Page
the total revenue cu~ve up 50 that even though
the same fish could be ha~ve5ted with fewer boats, the
cost and revenue curves will intersect. To the fisherman~
this means that he is still making a profit and that the
economist's doomsday predictions are wrong~
A CHANGE IN PRICE
Figure ten represents the ~conomist's v i e wp o i n t that
i ·f an industry is in equilibrium, an increase in price
will encourage new entrants and cause an over-exploitation
of the fishery. An increase in price will cause the total
revenue curve to shift up and the intersection of the
total cost curve will shift to the right. This right-hand
shift is proportional to the number of new vessels
encouraged into the fishery. Conversely~ a decrease in
the price will force some fishermen out of the fishery.
Economists would argue that the fishermen are mixing
issues when they point out that the increase in price will
offset the decrease in catch. The economists would
maintain that
\
with a good management plan the same amount
of fish could be harvested using fewer vessels.
COST CUTTING TECHNOLOGY
An economist would also maintain that a new
cost-cutting technology would encourage an e>~cess of
fishing vessels to enter the fishery. For e xample, if a
vessel installs a Kart Nozzle, the fuel consumption will
drop by ten per cent. The same amount of fishing at a
lower cost causes the intersection of the cost cur ve and
the revenue curve to shift to the r ight, indicating to the
economist that
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new vessels will enter and cause excessi ve
harvesting capacity (figure eleven). The economist would
recommend that a management plan should tax the excess
profits to restrict new entrants.
CATCH PER UNIT EFFORT
in catch per unit effort occurs when a more
effective method catching fish is introduced (figure
twelve). For example, the menhaden boats started using
airplane spotters, which direct the boats to the fish and
increase the catch rate. The v e s s e l could then make more
sets in a day and, consequently~ the standard v e s s e l
became more e fficient. The total revenue curve shifted to
t h e right, and, from the economist's viewpoint, the
existing fleet was suddenl y too large to efficiently
har vest
either
the f i s h .
recommend
To counter this, an economist would
a technology restriction or a limited
entry and buy back program.
VESSEL ECONOMICS
The economist's view is based on the assumption that
the fish are owned by one government and should be managed
through treating the industry as an individual. In the
real world fishermen indi vidual businesses that
maximi ze their own share of the wealth. The f i s h e r me n' s
economic decisions, wh ich in aggregate constitute the
industry, need better e xplanation in order to understand
the actual system. A management technique can then be
hypothisized, a n d the aggregate of the individual
reactions can h ~ an ti cipated.
a s;i x t y 'f Dot
gl~ aphecl in figure thirteen42. Once a fishing v e s s e l is
c onst r ucted , :L t is locked into a s ystem of relationships
betv-1l"2 f2 r"i
f i she':;.
its; cost;
'1"1-'1 i ',; can
operation and the number of clays it
only be changed b y constructing a new
investing in a modification. In the short run,
or- on a day-to-day basis, the 'v'essel must opet-ate
according tD this system. The fisherman can only adjust
the number of days fished in order to adjust his income.
The c o s t;
LL--
are cal ell ,-at.ed by
d i v i d Ln q CO,,;t s (Fe)
'f i ~:;h eel. costs are such things as mortgage
payments;, doc:king fees, or lIcense fees. All fi;:ed costs
(Fe) exist whether or not the v e s s e l goes fishing.
The average variable coats (AVe) are calculated by
totaling such costs as fuel, ice, food, or gear repair and
d iv t d I n q by thl=:! number- o ·f 'v'er- i ab 1 e c osts
(:;)('?nel~all'/ increase as the ves~:;(,? 1 is fished more days.
be a variable cost in most industries, but in
thE~ fishing is a function of the gross
stock or- 'v a l u e . Therefore it is not included in
t h i s, cas;e.
The a verage total cost (ATe) is the sum of the fixed
CAFC) and variable cost (AVe). The marginal cost (MC) is
42Th(~
c ori f i d,=~rlt i a l
I:::n,:;) 1 an d +1 \'2e'l:: "
d i':1 t <:'\
tlc\'5:i~;
{Dr
f rcim
this (;Wl~\ph
a \/ (,?ssel
was suppli ed on a
operating in the New
tile chi:lnq€·? in
F'aqe
total costs devided by the change in days
·f i ~5hed. V)"'lene vel··· cost curve (Me) and the
.:i\vel'·· age total cost curves <ATe) intersect~ the v e s s e l is
fishing at it s most efficient rate.
these calculations and graphs~ the minimum
any particular number of days fished can
IJe E?stimated. This means that~
plans to fish for 225 days in a y e a r he must
catch (~nough f i !5h to gross $1020 a day in order to cover
and V€·?s~sel c o~:· t ss, Dep€,;>nd i nq on thE' pr-i CE? and
fish, a fisherman will plan his fishing
strategy accordingly. fish for money and not
'f o r fish. For in5tance~ if t h e price i s fi xed at thirty
cents a pound~ the fisherman must bring in three thousand~
four hundred pounds in order to s t a y in business.
A FISHERY IN EQUILIBRUM
This relationship between the number of days fished~
the pric\:? P'=?~- pound, and the quantity of fish caught per
is graphed in figure fourteen. The bottom gr aph s h o ws
the relationship between catch a n d price for three levels
fishing acti vity for our standard vessel.
line were drawn ·f ,·- o ro the pl"- ice a.t t.h i r t. v cents
hO t··i::::onti:ll accross the page it will intersect the 2 0 0 day
an a verage catch of 3500 pounds per d a y. This
,,,d ong tAli th two whicil were introduced
will be used as a tool to g raphicall y compare th e
economist's v i ews o n man c:lq E?il1E'n t wi th the effect on the
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industr y .
REGULATION BY PERMITS OR FEES
Regulation by permits, 'f e e s ~ or limited entry~
increases the fi xed costs of operating a fishing vessel.
III the case of charging fee for management
control, it i-s easy to see how the fixed costs will go up.
In the case of limited entry, a cash value accrues to the
right to fish, thereby increasing the fixed
person who wants to enter the fishing business would be
willing to pay the current permit-holder money for the
right to fish. In order t o f i n a n c e the purchase of the
license or to forgo the i~trest payments of the mone y in a
bank account, the current owner must be earning a premium
using the license.
Consequently~ the average fi xed cur ve CAFe)
graphed in f igure f ifteen shifts up when a management
technique is used which increases the f ixed cost of
operation. The average total cost (ATe) also shifts up in
direct proportion to the shift in the a verage fi xed cost
(AFC) cur ve. The resulting shi ft upward and t o the right
of t h e intersection point between the marqinal cost (Me)
curve and the average total cost (ATe) cur ve indicates
that the vessel will tend to fish mor e day~ e a ch y e a r and
it must earn more revenue on each t~ip. The increase in
~equired revenue will c a use e a c h isoquant cur v e to s hi f t
up and to the right. If it is assumed that the price of
fish is b e y o n d the control of the f isherman, then the
isoquant diagram indicates that the v e s s e l must catch more
fish.
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From an aggregate of these individual respon ses i t
can be concluded that the i n d u s t r y would improve their
t echnolog y in order to catch more fish each day.
On the other side of the discussion there IS t h e
economist who looks at t h e industr y cost/revenue (TC/TRl
curve and sees an increase in the slope of the total cost
line. He would conclude that the regulation by permits l
f ees ~ or limited entr y should force s o me vessels out of
the fishery and decrease the fishing effort. In fact~
some of the marginal operators would go bankrupt and leave
the fishery. But those who stayed would be fishing harder
and catching more fish. The net effect would most likely
be negligible
costs.
in terms of f i s h i n g effort and industry
Regulation b y permits and tees cannot discriminate
between fishermen on the basis of residence unless there
is a consi stent di sparity in the size of v e s s e l s of the
s t a t e s . The change in the ratio of fixed to variable
costs is inversely proportional to the size of the v e s s e l .
III other words, the small v e s s e l s Hould pay a larger
percentage of their potential revenue for the privilege of
having a permit to fish.
Standard Fi ve prohibits a FMP which. has economic
allocation its 501e purpose. Permits and Fees do not
reduce fishing e ffort s o their sale ef fect i s economic
allocation i Il favor of the large operator. standard Four
prohibits di scrimination against residents of di f ferent
states. ] " £" I most of the v e s s e l s o f one state are smaller
than
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another state's f l e e t , permits and fees would viol ate
Standard Four. The Regional Councils should be concerned
about both effects bec ause permits and fees are at least
unfair to some segements of the industry.
REGULATION BY EFFORT TAX
Fisheries management regulations, through taxes on
fuel, ice, or the number of days fished, cause an increase
in variable c o s t s . In effect, taxes of this t ype are
effort taxes, because a fishing boat would only pay th em
when it engages in fishing. Effort tax regul ation is v e r y
v i s i b l e to the fisherman, because the tax is paid e very
day~ so it would be political ly unpopular and d ifficult to
enforce.
With arl e ff or t t a x, the a verage v a r i a b l e cost (AV e)
c urve s h if t s upward (figure sixteen), and the marginal
cost (Me) cur ve shifts upward as a result. The
i n t e r s e c t o n between the marginal (Me) and a verage tot al
cost (ATe ) curves shi ft s upward and to the left . Thi s
means that the fisherman in our e xample will decreas e the
number of days " fi shed, but h e will need an increase in
revenue each day he f ish es. The i soquant cur ves will
shi ft to the right and upward just like the f ix e d cost
increase discussed earlier.
The isoquant
f o r c e d increase
curves s h o w that the f i s he r ma n wo ul d ~LJE
hi s dai 1 y catch , i f trle pri ce i s
assumed to be outsi d e hi s c o n t r o l . The aggregate impact
o ·f regula tion by effort tax would be to decrease the
n u mb er o ·f days fished " but, increase the p ounds t ak en eac h
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day. These effects would tend to cancel eachother and
distroy the effectivness of this management technique.
The economist, on the other hand, sees an increase in
the slope of the industry total cost line and concludes
that an effort tax would be a rational way to decrease
fishing effort. Like the case with fixed cost regulation,
some of the marginal operators would fail, but those left
in the industr y would develop more efficient wa ys of
harvesting fish. Although an economist would not view
this as an undesirable trend, he may question why society
should force technological changes with a technique that
is only marginally effective at reducing fishing effort .
Effort tax regulations would change the ratio between
the fixed a n d v a r i a b l e costs, s u c h as the fi xed c ost tax.
The overall effect would be to favor the under 6 0 foot
vessel. The 6 0 to 100 foot v essel s would be hard hit, but
the 100 foot plus would have only a minor disadvantage.
This means that Standard Five may be violated, but
Standard Four is not, unless there 1S a disparity in the
size of v e s s e l s between the states.
REGULATION p v.•,' 1 QUOTAS
Regulati on by quotas does not affect the individual
boat's cost curves or the industr y cos~ and
curves. Th e impact of quotas is on the isoquant cur ve.
Figure seventeen shows that if a v e s s e l is g i ven a quota
for the year, or for the week, it c an catch the q uota in
severa]. The v e s s e l can fi sh 200 days and catch 2750
pounds per trip; if the p r i c e i s 3 9 cents per pound he can
li.ving. could also elect to catch
11,000 pounds pe~ t~ip if the price is 18 cents pe~ pound.
thC':\t t·.llf? c.::ltc:h pe~ day fished is not
b y the fisherman, ':5Cj in sf f ect ~I
system determines the price that mu st; 1:'1 ('2 P c\ :i. d ,:1 n d t h (.?
nurltbt~I'- of days the vessel will fish. The fishe~man cannot
change the number of f i s h i n g days 50 he loses his ability
to adjust his income. In p~actice the fishermen have been
."b 1 i~ to evade the quota b y landing fish that are claimed
t o bl~ cauqht inside th~ee miles or by landing in seve~al
pO;·-·t5. tl"· :i. c; k cod fo~ haddoc k o~
pClllock and not reco~ding the sales p~ope~ly. In e ':5 ':;encE~,
the f~eedom of a fishe~man to op e~ a t e his
:i. to; most 1'- ~1 t E.? ~I arid
attained thei~ objecti v e o f c on~e~ v i n g the resource.
Ouota5 lrJoul [1 violate Standa~d Four if the catch from
the Fishery Conse~vation Zone is taken evenly th~oughout
the yea~ b y the f ishe~men from one state and i n a short
catches a r e c aused b y the
patt:E?~n·:; of the f i s h as the y react to seasonal
in food, tempe~ature, etc. and not b y the type of
i 1""1 \ /01 vi2d ..
economicall y e xcluded
wi th c:,ut
in
E\ t.rI p
shOI'-t
1 :l mi t.
the catch is o ften very high
a trip limit the f ish e r me n
1,'·JelU 1.:1 to catch what he needs to a verage
the low of f- season In the off-~eason, any
1 i in:i. t enough b ecause the fishe~men cannot
c atch f i Sll Consequently~ this fisherman c annot
V,j i 11
to fi sh the species in t he t raditional season 50 he
fish for t he next best specie a n d J h i s net profits for
Contrast this ef fect with a
who f i s h e s steadily y e a r r ound and i s ab l e to
occurs periodicall y, the economic e xclusi on c aused
b r L rrq
wrli ell
:i. n h i is limi t. e vet-·y t,,- i p , In a lean fishing year
by a quota on a traditional cat c h c an force f ish e r me n f rom
on,;? stat,:e i nt o bankrupt c y wi t hou t f o r c ±n g all fishermen
into bankr uptc y . I f this e ffect is not d iscriminator y
qoo t ass ar-(!2 n ot;
n o t v i o l <:\t ed«
disc r imin ator y a n d S tandard Four i s
PI: :GUUH I DI'~ BY CLOSI::D m~A~301\1
by c losed s easo n a f f ects pr i mari ly the
C I·1 0 j. c e t h e ri g h t number o f days for each vessel.
In t he e xample shown i 11 figure e i g h t e en , t h e season i s
closed after 100 days o f fishi ng. Th i s does not a l te r the
c ost c u rves f or th e v esse l but , i t d oes f ix the cost per
da y' 'f: i shecJ at the f i sh e r ma n wouJ.d
achieve whil e o p e r at i n g o n In pract ical t erms
this means the f i sherman must pay hi s f ix e d costs in fewer
th i:Hl b e for e the cl o sure.
(.~5sum:L nq that the f i sh erman c annot i n c reas~ t he amoun t o f
h e c a t c hes e very day , the on ly possibilit ies o f
p r- 0 f i. t. a b I "~ at- e t o f :i ':=, h for s o met h i ng e ls8 o r
have a substantia l inc r e a s e in th e pr ice .
Unf o l~ tull:~, t e l y, c:1 O~5 t~d :~l~;o '-Fi. :.;e ':5 t r'iS
lin e for e ac h fi sherman' s o p e r ati on .
that
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the fisherman has no wa y of responding to the
fluctuations in the operating factors except by changing
his tarqet spec ies because the price is fixed outside his
control by supply and demand, and the catch per day is
fixed by the environment.
If a species is regulated with a closed season, the
market will be flooded with fish during the open season
and the prices will be depressed until the season is
closed. When the season is closed the prices soar, but
the fishermen cannot go fishing. This causes e xcessive
over-capacity in fishing vessels and in the processing
sector, which remains idle during the off-season.
Consumers require a constant suply of fish i f they are
going to maintain or e xpand thei r use of fish. A closed
season
demand.
eliminates this possibility and decreases consumer
Consequently a closed season causes the price for
the fish to decrease.
The short term effect of a closed season is . ~ . _.LU force
to . c o n t i n u e fishing for an alternative species.
This means that the alternative species will have too many
vessels depending on it for survival and it will soon be
regulated as well. The fishcrats would assume that if all
the species are regulated some of these vessels would
become marginal and get out of the industr y. In f a c t in a
medium term this would happ en, but in the long term the
size of the vessels would reduce in order to align the
intersection the margin al cost cur ve and the revenue
curve with the number of days available in the season.
The number of
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vessels would i n c r e a s e and the fish stocks
Unfortunatel y; the newwould
small
be once again
vessels would
o ver f i shed.
not be competitive i ·f the closed
s ea s o ns ended so removin g the closures would be
politically unpopular.
The economic hardship caused b y closures i s more
damaging to the fishermen from some states and not others.
This would happ en if the c l o s u r e occurred in the high
catch season of one state and in a low or a verage catch
season of another state. The residents of one s t a t e wo u l d
be effectivel y stopped from participating in the fishery.
The seasonal migrations of fish stocks cause the
fishermen from different states to f ish for different
species at di fferent times o f t h e y e a r . The f i s h e r me n
must catch the closest fish to hi s port, the fish which is
in season or the .mo s t plentiful at the time, and the fish
with the best price in order to be competitive with other
fishermen from other c o u n t r i e s and states. A cl osed
of the species of fish which is traditionally
caught will c ause the fi sherman to t r a v e l farther from
p ort, fish on the next most plentiful fish, and have one
less choice in the price category.
This means that h is a verage costs wil~ i n c r e ase and
his ave r a g e revenues will fall . This doubl e-edged squeeze
will ensure that he is less competitive than his
counterpart in another state who wa s not e l i mi n ated from
the fishery by a c l o s u r e . III those le.an y ear s the
fishermen from the states where the closur es eliminate
them ~",.Ii 11
',, 7
'-' /
" ( I.J'" .:1" n k 1" UI~) t b p-f Dr \':1 t, I', E:!i to, c Dun t E:!rl'] dr- t s i n o t; h (::!I'"(,:1::J r
th i '::; i.s not. a di scr im inator y eff ect then
season s a re no t di s cr iminat.or y and do not violate
Standard Four o f the FCMA.
Th ~? ty' P€'? requlation that p l ea ':se t h e
,Fi s h e r me n wouldn"t af fect. hi s p erson a l s et of E:!cclrlomi c
It If'IOLtl d instead affec t the i n d u s t ry wide cost
Ex ampl es would be me sh restrictions~ hook
s i z o lirnits , o r randDm closed areas. A discussion o f the
random c l osed areas will clarif y the economic consequences
:i. rnp J. i c a t; ions of this t vp e of
Thf? CDn cppt t o take a chec ker b oard, such a s a
I 01'" ' .:in "- c (;J r ' i cl , and pI ac t:? i t OVE~I~ the fi ':;h i riq qrounds.
E \leJ~Y CJt t"I1:~ r" s5quar-e wouJ. c:1 be closeel to "C 1 5 h i nq The si z eI ..
of t h E:! cl clsecl be adjusted t o r espond to
n a'tura I f 1 uc t u et ions in the populations o f fi sh. The
~5 '/st(~ii1 I;,J Du l d b y red uc: i n g t h e c a tch per unit eff ort
t?:>: per i (:':! n c eel :i n t h e industr y ( figure nineteen) . T \'''II:? -f: i I'· '=5 t
i?of f ect: :i s tel ~:;h i f t the total revenue (TR ) c ur v e to t h e
r a qht , ','Ii J. 1 balance the increase i n vesse l s . Then
E~cDIiDm:i.c th e syst em wouJd
t o s ~ en d mo re da y s a t s ea , a n d t he industr y
t. ota l C:CJ ~sts (T C) :i nCI~ e a s~(:? [: (::)1:.1"1
but the
isoq uant cur v es would Th er e i s s o me th i n g t o
abou t; a s ystem that for ces a f ishe r ma n t o lea ve
the system because he could not adequately compete rather
beci:\us;e the rules were unjust. Contrast that to a
which doe"::; not allow the traditional
en-- economic pressure on the
An advantage to this type of management is its ease
Aside from the fact that the fishermen
CDulci viol ator s because the rules are easy to
uridorstand , the Coa s t; need only fl y over a closed
in IJrder tel Cl"il~ck IJ",/ if the fishing gear is
way to enforce the closure j. s to
digital tape recDrclers that could monitor
the boat's engine performance as well
position to prove a v i o l a t i o n .
..';'5
i"1esl"i size o r random closed areas do not change the
economic s y s t e m that the industr y is used to.
j "1". i s pl~acti ced c a r: 0? .";= u I I Y and em l "y' the adul ts an?
they reproduce once, this type o f
1"·- 1:2 cJ u 1 at ion cDuld ae:hi€;? ve all the standards set forth in
In Standard Four i s not violated
because no discrimination would take p l a c e on the basis of
n ·?si dene y.
CONCLU~3I 01\1:=;
In there are fi ve categories o f management
t,=?chn i qU ,::! ',5:
( 1) The mE~t.liod=; o f iTl.::lrlaqemen"l: the-l ot increase the fixed
c oss.:ts of thi2 ·f :i sh i. nq v e s s e l s a r e permits, an d
("2ntr· ',/ • Fi x ed cost management techn iques probabl y
violate Standard but they have ec onomic
a l 1 oc a t; i. em a '5 only effect which violates Standard
C2) Th e methods that increase v a r i a b l e cost s are effort
ta::·:e'5 on da.y~; DI~ .:3 f ue 1 t; C:\ ;'; • Effort taxes force
industry to fish more days per year and catch more
·f i sh Therefore, they are ineffective tools to
regulate the fisheries.
The methods that interfere with the price and catch
's u b s i d i. 125. If
n ·?si dents only one state out o-f a bus i ness i !5
these managementd i scr- i mi n atory
d i ·sc I~ i min i:ittor' y .
(4) the methods that fi x the time spent fishing are closed
season s or quotas, the season when they are
filled. This group of management techniques have the same
effect as those mentioned jn section ( 3 ) .
(5) The last category is methods which affect the industry
rl·?VenUe C(:J ~:;t i n c l u d e gear restrictions ,
v i::::! s s e l size of fish limitations, and closed
~'J ill
This category has the least discriminatory effects
eventuall y be accepted as the onl y wa y to fairly
manage a fishery.
Politically speakIng, the f i sher y biologist s prefer a
~; y~;;tem 0+ iTlC:'Inageinent ~·.,Ih i ch limited entr y, but
they would be satisfied with quotas and closed s e asons if
the OY were not
Ec;on orni ~:;; t .::. \-\1 :i. I 1
raised e very time there i s a c l osu r e .
for limited entr y and feel the mesh
regulati ons and closed
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areas are useless. The fishermen
do not li ke th e quot a s an d closures and woul d p r e f e r
techniques which a ffect the i ndustry cost revenue cur ves.
CH{-~F'TEH '.../ I . DI FFERENTIAL IMPACTS OF MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
Th i ts c:1.clptE!t'"" attempt s to an swer the followi.ng b asic
qL.lestions~ (1) Does a manag ement technique violate
b y discriminating .=\q i:.i nst
d i f +1~~I"'ent ( 2 ) If the management technique d o e s
not. violate Standard S ll o u l d t.he Secretary of
Comroer-ce <:-\nd thE' RE?gional Fisheries Management Coun cils
t ake c o r r ec t ive action to avoid economic hardship?
The Secretar y of the Department of Commerce has been
the fi sheries management plan s are
consistent the seven nation al standards set forth in
'5(~ct i o n 301. the FC;I'1{~ o f Although all sev e n
standards ar e of equal weight for legal purp05es~ Standard
is of importance in t.his paper.
p r- oh i b i. t~:; discrimination of fishery management plans
residents of different states . Examination o f the
l~gislative history will hel.p clarify the meaning o -[-
di scrimination in thi s contex t.
(4) Conservation and management measures shall
not d i scrimin a te between r esidents of different
States. If it becomes necessar y to allocat e or
ass i g n fish ing pri vleges among various United
States fishermen, such a l l o c a t i o n shall be (A)
of a:i. I" ",'Ind (":)q u i t:. '::Ib 1 (.: t:. o i:Ot 11 '=;UC: h of:i. !=;h (;2r' ,TIE·)!', ; ( D)
reasonabl y c a lc u l a t e d to promote conservation;
and (C ) carried o u t in such a manner that no
par-ticular- i no i vi du a L, COI·-pC!I·-ati.oll~ 01'- othel~
ent ity acqui res a n ex c ess i ve s h a r e elf s u c h
P 1'- i. v:i 1 '? ~J e~::;4:3.
DEFF I NIT I ON OF DISCRIMINATION
The :i. n
F'age 72
Is "eli !:; c l~ i rni n a t e "
Websters defines l' eli!5CI·- i mi n Eltf? " EIS; "t.o ina !-:: (? a cJi~.tinctiCJn
in f a vol·- rOT o n e person or thing as compared
Dther··::; .. " Following this reasoning~ if a management
technique were to make a difference Dr distinction between
o f 5 t ,:it t. e!:; St:. and c:\r d wou l (j
p r oh t bi ti. t. Standard Four a l s o has instructions as to how
to pr e vent di scrimination. If the manag ement plan is
" fair- and equitable to all
e n s u r e s that no
e }(cessi.ve ·:;h ar e ~ II then it is not ,jiscl~iil1inator-y ..
BLATANT DISCRIMINATION
E~ }( amp 1 e s elf discr imination :i. n
fisheries regulations~ as e xemplified .in the Douglas v=.
Sea Coast Products l a wsu it . The c a se wa s t h e resu l t o f a
vt r q i n i e n law that excluded cd 1 f :i. ·s ll e ,·- me n its
residents from participating in the menhaden f ish e r i e s
inside its state waters. The dec:i~;icJrl declar-inq the
\) :i. 1·- (J i n i. i:\ Il law unconstitutional was unequi vocal e v i d e n c e
t.h at; laws excluding persons from a f i s h e ry on the basis o f
residenc y were discriminator y .. !: ; (.:::r1 t an c (o? :i Il
Felur from the FCMA clearl y prohibit s this kind of
blatant discrimination ..
!3er.: .
fish ery conservat ion
;:::01
and
C:d (4). I\Ji:"\t:i anal
mo~nag 0?m(~I-1 t .
fo r
F';:\(.:.1 e
INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION
"../ ..,.
.I ...:1
cjisr-tmillation i '5 not always a s easil y
i d erd: if i E~d if the statute does not e xpli citl y e x cl ude
on the basis of r esidenc y. For e xample, there is
law in Maine that prohibits lobster fishing on Sunday.
Both part-time and f i s h e r me n are included in
the law, b u t; t h e effect is to make it impossible for an
o ut-of-state weekend Th e
15 effectivly excluded, and th~ commercial
operator i e hardly e ven inconvenienced.
har-dship caused b y fisher-ie s management
in the nOI'-theast e xplicitly based on t h e
;,;i. ·f f I:='C t I:;?cj di fferentl y because of their g e o g r a p h i c location
o r The differ-ential E-:conomi c i mp ac t;
closures between residents of differsnt states is severe.
In or-der- to addr-ess this issue on .:;\ !5t a t i sti cal
were collected on a monthly
b asis for thirteen years pr-ior- to the FCMA. Th<'? i mport.i:int
species wer-e assumed to be cod, haddock, and y e l l o wt a i l ,
bE?C all SE:: t h~:y i::\ I' · e t.he ·r i I~St. ql~Dund ·f i s h
I~ l thoucJh t h e s e species do not mi g r a t e
miles like b ir-d s, f i shermen ha v e fo u n d
that e a c h · species h as a har- vesting
with the ha~vesting season in one state and not
i n another would be disc~iminatory.
CUD I:~ I ::3H CYCLES
cod +i ::;11
monthl y c ycles which are out of phase between the states
Isl ,:iI"ld~ l'1 aine~ and Massachusetts. Thf? eyel:i. nt;)
C,-2'f 'fect 0+ the numerical averages of the
per"cent o f y e a r l y harvest for each month (figure twenty).
Th e phases of these monthly cycles become important when
fisher y regulation~ imposing quotas or closed seasons are
consid f?:?I'-' (·?<:I fDr i nc Lus i on into management plans. I ·f' ti,e
cod is closed in March, the Rhode Island fisherman'
wClLll d b(-? cut. clff from their most producti ve c o d f i s h i n g
fOI~ the If the closure were to occur in June , the
li'JC1Ul d be excluded f r o m one of t h e i r best
months .. Although Massachusetts accounts for
eighty si x percent of the tota l cod fish caught in the New
area~ the importance of the catch to the Maine andEn q l end
1::;1, ode 151 c\ri d should not be underestimated ( f :i. c;:)ure
t~",ent y-on e) .
R(2gulc:\ti em
detl~ i. roental effects on the fishermen from Rhode Island and
1 a i ne. Because of the cod fish c y c l e s , the catches of cod
a re hi.ghly variable b,~tIAleen the states (figure twenty>.
This means that if quot as s e t dail y catch or trip limits
on the fishermen, the st ate where the f i s h i n g is seasonal
1.;,Ii 11 not be able to c atch enough fish during th e sea son t o
a veraqe with the o f f -se a s o n catches. The Maine and Rhode
si mp ly could not t i,e
Massachusetts f i s h e r me n . Thi s problem i s nat as serious
the Massachusetts fleet
" '7 1:::-
.I ,.J
because fishing for cod I S
rnor E~ c:on ~s t arrt; Even the practice of weekl y quot as
I,A) i. 1 l. not inequities between the
The economics of cod in Maine and Rhode
lsI c\nd indicate a double penalty. First~ because the
carm o t; + i s h l arge catches in s e a s o n , the
1:; n~duce<:l" This means the f ish
must ',;€.?], ], ,:1t pi" :i. C€? , r.],', the fishermen are to
sur"vi V E: " However, it is clear from the pie chart (figur e
twen t '/-one) that fishermen from Maine and Rhode Island
recei ve less for their fish t ha n their counterparts f rom
1'1,:i ';s ';sachuset t 5,. Regul. ation b y quotas or closed season will
e conomic impact on Maine and Rh o d e Isl and
Maine's fishermen a
P £21~ C E~n t; 2(,;) (~ of catch being cod than those fishermen
I':;land, so Maine's fishermen are at an even
greater disadvan tage when quot as or closures occur.
Of the manac]ement
t(~chniques, i n c r e a s e s in the a verage f i xed c o s t or a verage
discr iminate between residents o f
d I 'f 'f e r e n t st ates because their 1· ,: .,.,
I~ c onc)m i c: one and dO€2S not depend on I'c;.,rv~?,st 1~,:;1.tes.
tec:hni que!:;; 'thc\t
and c ost a s closed areas, do not
di off (~ r E!II t. i ,:\1 1 ''1' impac t these s t a t e s . Thi s is bec ause these
techniques do not control the n umber of days f i s h e d or the
,:I.mount. -Fish caught b y a vessel dLlI'- i ng / 'CJ,.. the
season.
as hard
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In other words, a f i s h e r ma n can fish 25 long and
as he wants without interference provided that he
is not f i s h i n g with a small mesh or in a closed a rea.
HADDOCK CYCLES
The differential impact between residents of
dif ferent states due to cycles in haddock catches is
different f rom cod because the prices of haddock are
higher for the states wi th the highest variabilit y in
c a t c h es and the phases of the seasons are different
(f ig u r e twent y two). The same problem e~ists for haddock
which was discussed for cod; that is, if closed seasons
are used to regulate the fishing industry, there are
differential impacts between resident s rO T differen t
statesu Again, Maine and Rhode Island are th e states that
would be impacted more than Massachusetts. Examinati on of
the pie charts in figure twenty three indicates that Maine
will be more severly impacted than Rhode Island. The
quotas on haddock also prevent the Maine and Rhode Is land
f i s h e r me n from c atching large hauls which are
necessar y to a verage with the losses in the off season.
YELLOWTAIL CYCLES
Ye l lowt a i l flounder are caught primarily b y
Massachusetts and Rhode Island f i s h e r me n ~~thin the data
collecti on a~ea. Ev en though t h e Maine catch is graphed
in figure t we n ty four, the thirteen y e a r average catc h for
Maine was less than on e h alf of o n e percent (figur e twen t y
-fi ve) and the standard deviation is greater th an the mean
for the percentages caught. This mean s that wh e n Maine
F'i:li.:.1 f? 77
catch yellowtail it is highly unusual and not an
i mp or t arit; their fishing revenue.
curves for Massachusetts and Rhode Island are compared,
they are ver y similar.
serious differential impacts between these states if the
included quotas and closed seasons.
are very seasonal in New York and New
Jersey and these states were not included in the data base
for this thesis, so discrimination from quotas or closed
seasons can not be proved or disproved for these states.
ECONOMIC HARDSHIP
It that fisheries regulations that use
quotas and closed seasons do cause an economic hardship on
fishermen which is more severe in some states than others.
examination of the legislativE history of the FCMA
helps to clarify whether Dr not the second half
StandC:H-cj FOLW t h i s ·t ype o·f economic
d i seri mi nat.i on ,
DISTINCTION BETWEEN RESIDENTS
D:i. ~:;cr-i mi nati CJn is defined as a distinction, made in
o·f one person or group over another.
(j :i. s.c r i 1T1 in c.'\t :i. on
madE'" bl~tv..leen
to e xist, some f o r m o f distinction must be
the Senate Committee on ~-:;enC\tor 1 a i,;:J n u SDn
be pressu~es on
representatives to protect the residents of their home
notn i n q will destroy the effectiveness of this ne~
management progr am mo~e than i+ olle state, o~ group of
~; t iott (:2~:; 01 attempts to favor own residents to the
d I,,:t I'" i ITI£,2 n t elf Senator Magnuson saw that e ven
t.h ouqh the same stock of fi sh, the
pol i ti. cal qr oupi n o into states distinguishes
··F i sh£~rmen.
UNJUST DISTINCTION
d i ~: :; C I'- i mi nat i (In also requires the
d i. .:; t j. n c t i. 0 n to be unjust. "Just" i ·:; defined as mot-ally
r I (dllt or good , and having a basis in or c o n f o r mi n g to fact
ot"- Un just must be the inverse of just, or not
or q o od , not having a basis in or
conforming to reason. Senator Magnuson gave the following
hypothetical e xample which he f elt wa s discr iminatory:
11 I'f= ,
ca tch
c CJc:<.~' t
Sl-loul d
if tlle '/
for example, the most efficient a r e a to
fish during their migration is near the
of Rhode Island,New Jersey fi shermen
be allowed an equiatable portion of catch
al eo fish the samf-? st oc k , "44
In
c 1 (JSLlt'"" es ~I
both
the
Magnuson's e xample and the c ase of quotas or
inequities are caused by the migration of
·t h e f :i sh(~rr11en are distinguished b y their residence
in d i -r ··F 1:2I'-ent and they are harvesting the same
s t o c k of f :i. !5 h . man would conclude that a
closure or a quota which caused economic hardship based on
in the view of Senator Magnuson, an unjust
d i a t Ln c ti i ori
di scriminatol~ Y·
r-esi d€:,;nt s· and
F',:\CJe
44Legislati ve Hi story. p. 686.
C(JNCLU ~; I ous
The objectives which are chosen for the fisheries
management plans will be effected by the pol itics of the
i nsti tut.i on a in vol ved i n the management process. Elp (~C i cOl I
groups represented on the Regional Councils will
e ··f -Fect. the determin ation of the Optimum Yield. Tlir,2 NI"IFS
has the abilit y to effect the DY by interpreting imprecise
data.
I t has b fEen qUDtas and closed seasons
p ,,- \",, ···,·en t SOmE? ·f i shel~men from harvesting their traditional
It has also been shown that, although this
i·:; an un intent:i. anal ~;i d e e 'ffect management through
quota E; ancl it could avo i dec! I:J 'y' u s:i. n (;:) a
manag.=?ment techn i qUE' such as random closed
TherefCJre, r egulation b y quotas and closed season s
consti tut(:?s an un j u st; and avoidable distintion between
\"('25 i dents of di f·fe.r(~nt ~5 t at.(·?s . Simpl y put, quotas and
closures discriminate a q a i n s t; fishermen on the bas is o f
residence which is e xplicitly prohibited in S t a n d a r d Four.
Th(~ F:E'q :i. on a I Councils ':sh o u l cI cons ider (::! c o n o mi c
eli scr·i mi nati on they deliberate the pros a n d con s o f
management technique. Although legall y speaking onl y
the blatant discrimination such as that in ~he Douglas vs .
easil y be p~oven unlawful, the
half of Standard Four indicates that the alloc ati on
ma y produce undesirable or inequitable side
effects which should
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h~ avoided i'f possible. In all but
the industr y catch per unit effort categ ory the variation
in harvest seasorl S between states cause economic
discrimination between r esident s of di fferent st at~s or
have other undesirable secondary effects. Therefore~
fisheries management should rely upon management
techniques
I
like random closed areas and mesh regulations
i f economic discriminat ion i s t o be av o i d e d .
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TABLE 2
WHO IS WHO IN FISHERIES
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THE FISHING INDUSTRY
Page 8.)
F.I.GURE 1
STOCK
FISHING
MORTALITY
NATURAL
MORTALITY
RECRUITS .._ .......
CREPRODUCTION\...---_-::'l
fiSH STOCK CYCLE
AGE
LANDED
TOTAL
REMAIN
Number
of Fish
100
80
60
40
20
Page at,.
FIGURE 2
COHORT ANALYSIS DR
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FI-GURE J
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!'IGURE 4
FISH STOCK ASSESSMENT
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.FIGURE 5
MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE YIELD
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.. : FIGuRE 6
MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE YIELD
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FIGURE 7
INTRODUCTION OF ECONOMIC FACTORS.
GIVEN
A CATCH PER UNIT EFFORT CURVE
MILUONS
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If an M.S."- of 43 thousand metric tons is given and 46Vpound
is the price. the maximum total return is $43,500,000.
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FIGURE 8
INTRODUCTION OF ECONOMIC FACTORS.
GIVEN
A VALUE PER lJ,NIT EFFORT CURVE
MILLION
$ 50
TOTAL HARVEST COST
/
40
30
20
10
/
/
/
/
/
/
VALUE PER UNIT
EFFORT
400300200100 500 Standard
, Vessels
If the averaQe cost per standard vessel is $ 174,000
then the cost of 250 vessels needed to harvest M.S.Y.
i I $ 4~,500,OOO .
S 50
40
Q
-J
I.&J
->- 10
-. Page 91
FIGURE 9
EXPLOITATION OF
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FIGURE 10
A CHANGE IN PRICE
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FI..GURE 11
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TECHNOLOGY
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FIGURE 12
A CHANGE IN CATCH PER UNIT EFFORT
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FIGURE 1J
INTRODUCTION TO FISHING
VESSEL ECONOMICS
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CONTROL OVER THE NUMBER
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• THEREFORE THIS 60 FOOT
VESSEL SHOULD FISH 225
DAYS AND NEEDS A DAILY
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-FI GURE 14
A FISHERY IN EQUILIBRIUM
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FIGURE 15
REGULATION BY PERMITS OR FEES
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FIGURE 16
REGULATION BY EFFORT TAX
40
10
20
30
Millions$ 50 INDUSTRY COST-REVENUE
TC
AFC
I
/ MC,
,
" _~ ATC
-
VESSEL COSTS
Cost$1
100 200 300 Days 100 200 300 Vessels
Price
$ 1.00
.90
.8 0
.70
.60
.50
.40
.30
.20
.10
ISOQUANT DIAGRAM FOR
PRICE TO CATCH SUBSTITUTION
-------
-- ... _--~~--~
10 20 30 40 50 100
Catch in Hundreds of Pounds
150
Page 99
FIGURE 17
REGULATION BY QUOTAS
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FIGURE 18
REGULATION BY. CLOSED SEASON
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FIGURE 19
REGULATION BY CLOSED AREA
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FIGURE 20
COD FISH CYCLES
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, . F.I.GURE 21
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MARKET SHARE BETWEEN
MASSACHUSETTS, MAINE, RHODE ISLAND
89.42 %
MASS
DOLLARS
20
::x: 15
(.)
~
(.)
>~ 10
ct
LU
>-
La.
o
f1.5
MONTHS
20
UJ
~ 15
UJ
>
J,&J
a:
>~IO
ct
UJ
>-
La.
o
f1. 5
MONTHS
Page 104
FIGU]m 22
HADDOCK CYCLES
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-FI GURE 23
HADDOCK
MARKET SHARE BETWEEN
MASSACHUSETTS, MAIN.E, RHODE ISLAND
93.33 %
MASS
POUNDS
90.140/0
MASS
DOLLARS
20
15
:c
u
~
u
~IO
«
I.LJ
>-
U.
o
fI!. 5
Page 106
FIGURE 24
YELLOWTAIL CYCLES
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FIGURE 25
YELLOWTAIL
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